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Executive Summary
Over the past four decades, criminal 
justice policy in the United States was 
guided largely by a central premise: the 
best way to protect the public was to put 
more people in prison. A corollary was 
that offenders should spend longer and 
longer time behind bars. 
The logic of the strategy seemed 
inescapable—more inmates serving more 
time surely equals less crime—and policy 
makers were stunningly effective at putting 
the approach into action. As the Pew 
Center on the States has documented, the 
state prison population spiked more than 
700 percent between 1972 and 2011, 
and in 2008 the combined federal-state-
local inmate count reached 2.3 million, or 
one in 100 adults. Annual state spending 
on corrections now tops $51 billion and 
prisons account for the vast majority of the 
cost, even though offenders on parole and 
probation dramatically outnumber those 
behind bars.
Indeed, prison expansion has delivered 
some public safety payoff. Serious crime 
has been declining for the past two 
decades, and imprisonment deserves some 
of the credit. Experts differ on precise 
figures, but they generally conclude 
that the increased use of incarceration 
accounted for one-quarter to one-third of 
the crime drop in the 1990s. Beyond the 
crime control benefit, most Americans 
support long prison terms for serious, 
chronic, and violent offenders as a means 
of exacting retribution for reprehensible 
behavior.
But criminologists and policy makers 
increasingly agree that we have reached 
a “tipping point” with incarceration, 
where additional imprisonment will have 
little if any effect on crime. Research also 
has identified new offender supervision 
strategies and technologies that can help 
break the cycle of recidivism.
Across the nation, these developments, 
combined with tight state budgets, have 
prompted a significant shift toward 
alternatives to prison for lower-level 
offenders. Policy makers in several states 
have worked across party lines to reform 
sentencing and release laws, including 
reducing prison time served by non-
violent offenders. The analysis in this 
study shows that longer prison terms have 
been a key driver of prison populations 
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and costs, and the study highlights new 
opportunities for state leaders to generate 
greater public safety with fewer taxpayer 
dollars. 
A State-Level Portrait of 
Time Served
Prison populations rise and fall according 
to two principal forces: 1) how many 
offenders are admitted to prison, and 2) 
how long those offenders remain behind 
bars. In this report, Pew seeks to help 
policy makers better understand the 
second factor—time served in prison.
Historically, published statistics on 
offenders’ length of stay in prison 
consisted only of national estimates by 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau 
of Justice Statistics. The goal of this 
Pew report is to go beyond the national 
numbers and present a state-level portrait 
of how time served has changed during 
the past 20 years, how it has impacted 
prison populations and costs, and how 
policy makers can adjust it to generate 
a better public safety return on taxpayer 
dollars.
Toward that end, the study identifies 
trends in time served by state and by 
type of crime from 1990 to 2009, using 
National Corrections Reporting Program 
data collected from 35 states by the U.S. 
Census Bureau and the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. States not included in the study 
had not reported sufficient data over the 
1990–2009 study period. Pew also worked 
with external researchers to analyze data 
from three states to assess the relationship 
between time served and public safety. 
A Longer Stay in Prison
According to Pew’s analysis of state data 
reported to the federal government, 
offenders released in 2009 served an 
average of almost three years in custody, 
nine months or 36 percent longer than 
offenders released in 1990. The cost 
of that extra nine months totals an 
average of $23,300 per offender. When 
multiplied by the hundreds of thousands 
of inmates released each year, the 
financial impact of longer length of stay 
is considerable. For offenders released 
from their original commitment in 2009 
alone, the additional time behind bars 
cost states over $10 billion, with more 
than half of this cost attributable to non-
violent offenders.
“
We must change the way in 
which our laws work, 
change the way in which the 
system works, so that we can make 
a clear distinction between those 
who need to stay in prison to keep 
the public safe versus those who 
present little risk.” 
—hawaii governor neil Abercrombie (d), 
January 23, 2012
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Although nearly every state increased 
length of stay during the past two decades, 
the overall change varied widely among 
states. In a few states, time served grew 
rapidly between 1990 and 2009, among 
them Florida (166 percent), Virginia (91 
percent), North Carolina (86 percent), 
Oklahoma (83 percent), Michigan (79 
percent), and Georgia (75 percent). Eight 
states reduced time served, including 
Illinois (down 25 percent) and South 
Dakota (down 24 percent). Among 
prisoners released from reporting states in 
2009, Michigan had the longest average 
time served, at 4.3 years, followed closely 
by Pennsylvania (3.8 years). South Dakota 
had the lowest average time served at 1.3 
years, followed by Tennessee (1.9 years).
The growth in time served was remarkably 
similar across crime types. Offenders 
released in 2009 served:
n For drug crimes: 2.2 years, up 
from 1.6 years in 1990 (a 36 percent 
increase)
n For property crimes: 2.3 years up 
from 1.8 years in 1990 (a 24 percent 
increase)
n For violent crimes: 5.0 years up 
from 3.7 years in 1990 (a 37 percent 
increase)
Again, the national numbers mask large 
interstate variation. For violent crimes, 
Florida led the way among states with 
a 137 percent increase in length of stay, 
while prison stays for New York’s violent 
inmates rose only 24 percent. Property 
offenders in nine of 35 states served 
less time on average in the last available 
year of data compared with 1990, even 
as those in Georgia, Florida, Virginia, 
Oklahoma, and West Virginia saw average 
increases of more than a year. States such 
as Arkansas, Florida, and Oklahoma more 
than doubled average time served by drug 
offenders, even as Illinois, Missouri, New 
York, Tennessee, and Nevada cut average 
time served for the same group. 
0
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SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012
Time Served for Drug and Violent 
Crimes Grew At Similar Pace
Percent Increase in Average Time Served, 
1990 to 2009
36%
increase
24%
increase
37%
increase
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A Questionable impact on 
Public Safety
Despite the strong pattern of increasing 
length of stay, the relationship between 
time served in prison and public safety 
has proven to be complicated. For a 
substantial number of offenders, there is 
little or no evidence that keeping them 
locked up longer prevents additional 
crime.
A new Pew analysis conducted by external 
researchers using data from three states—
Florida, Maryland, and Michigan—found 
that a significant proportion of non-
violent offenders who were released in 
2004 could have served shorter prison 
terms without impacting public safety. 
The analysis identifies how much sooner 
offenders could have been released, 
based on a risk assessment that considers 
multiple factors including criminal history, 
the amount of time each person has 
already served in prison, and other data. 
Looking only at non-violent offenders, 
the analysis identified 14 percent of the 
offenders in the Florida release cohort, 18 
percent of the offenders in the Maryland 
release cohort, and 24 percent of the 
Michigan release cohort who could have 
served prison terms shorter by between 
three months and two years without 
jeopardizing public safety. 
Using this type of empirical analysis to 
inform release policies could reduce 
state prison populations and costs. If the 
reductions in length of stay identified by 
the risk analysis had been applied to non-
violent offenders in Florida, Maryland, 
and Michigan in 2004, the average daily 
prison population in those states would 
have been reduced by as much as 2,600 
(3 percent), 800 (5 percent), and 3,300 
(6 percent) respectively. These reductions 
represent substantial cost savings in each 
state: $54 million in Florida, $30 million 
in Maryland, and $92 million in Michigan. 
States Begin to moderate 
Time Served
Policy makers in all three branches of 
government can pull a variety of levers to 
adjust the amount of time offenders serve 
in prison. Prison time is influenced by 
both front-end (sentencing) and back-end 
(release) policy decisions. In several states, 
policy makers have undertaken reforms 
“
As we reserve more of our 
expensive [prison] bed space 
for truly dangerous criminals [we] 
free up revenue to deal with those 
who are not necessarily dangerous 
but are in many ways in trouble 
because of various addictions.”
—georgia governor nathan deal (r), may 1, 2012
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intended to stem the growth in time served, 
or actually reverse it, for certain offense 
types. These initiatives include:
n Raising the threshold dollar amount 
required to trigger certain felony 
property crime classifications. States 
include Alabama, Arkansas, California, 
Delaware, Montana, South Carolina, 
and Washington.
n Revising drug offense classification 
in the criminal code to ensure the 
most serious offenders receive the 
most severe penalties. States include 
Arkansas, Colorado, and Kentucky.
n Rolling back mandatory minimum 
sentencing provisions. States include 
Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, and New York.
n Increasing opportunities to earn 
reductions in time served by completing 
prison-based programs. States include 
Colorado, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin.
n Revising eligibility standards for parole 
consideration. States include Mississippi 
and South Carolina.
Strong Public Support for 
reform
Recent opinion polling suggests that these 
reforms are being received well by the public. 
A national January 2012 poll of 1,200 likely 
voters revealed that the public is broadly 
supportive of reductions in time served for 
non-violent offenders as long as the twin 
goals of holding offenders accountable and 
protecting public safety still can be achieved. 
Voters overwhelmingly prioritize preventing 
recidivism over requiring non-violent 
offenders to serve longer prison terms. 
Nearly 90 percent support shortening prison 
terms by up to a year for low-risk, non-
violent offenders if they have behaved well 
in prison or completed programming, and 
voters also support reinvesting prison savings 
into alternatives to incarceration. 
  * * * * *
The past five years have seen significant 
shifts in corrections policy across the 
nation, prompted both by tight budgets 
and by increasing understanding that there 
are more effective, less expensive ways to 
handle non-violent offenders than lengthy 
spells of incarceration. Public opinion, long 
concerned with controlling crime, is now 
focused more on cost-effectiveness and 
recidivism reduction than on traditional 
measures of “toughness.” 
Today, policy makers have a much better 
idea of what works to increase public safety 
than they did in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Research clearly shows there is little return 
on public dollars for locking up low-risk 
offenders for increasingly long periods of 
time and, in the case of certain non-violent 
offenders, there is little return on locking 
them up at all. In addition, actors at both 
sentencing and release stages of the system 
have increasingly sophisticated tools to help 
them identify these lower-risk offenders.
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States have been using this new 
information to improve results and 
reduce costs, and the analysis in this 
report shows that more savings can be 
garnered by thoughtfully calibrating 
time served, and thus ensuring there 
is adequate prison space for the most 
serious offenders. These promising 
practices and many others can serve as 
models for states looking to conserve 
precious public dollars while keeping 
communities safe.
ExECutivE Summary
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Between 1991 and 1995 the number of 
media reports on crime in the United 
States more than tripled, coinciding with 
a jump in public concern about the issue.1 
Federal and state lawmakers saw the 
reports and responded quickly. Reasoning 
that harsher sentences enacted in the 
1970s and 1980s had been responsible 
for the declining crime rates of the early 
1990s, they decided the answer was to go 
still further. At the time, little attention was 
paid to the impacts extending prison terms 
might have on public safety, or on costs to 
taxpayers.
The consequences are now well known. 
By 2008, the American prison population 
had soared—one out of every 100 adults 
was behind bars (see Figure 1). With this 
growth in prison population has brought 
rising costs. Across states, investment in 
corrections has jumped more than 300 
percent in the past two decades, with 
expenditures now totaling more than $51 
billion annually, or 7.3 percent of all state 
general fund spending.2
Greater imprisonment clearly has yielded 
public safety dividends, accounting for 
an estimated one-quarter to one-third of 
the crime drop during the 1990s.3 And 
in some cases, longer sentences were not 
only warranted to serve justice but also 
necessary to protect the public.
Although few Americans would question 
the wisdom of tough sentences for violent, 
chronic offenders, most criminologists 
now consider the increased use of prison 
for non-violent offenders a questionable 
public expenditure, producing little 
additional crime control benefit for each 
dollar spent.4 During the past decade, 
all 17 states that cut their imprisonment 
rates also experienced a decline in crime 
rates.5 And a 2006 legislative analysis 
in Washington State found that while 
incarcerating violent offenders provides a 
net public benefit by saving the state more 
than it costs, imprisonment of property 
and drug offenders leads to negative 
returns.6
Policy makers, anxious to conserve 
taxpayer dollars without sacrificing public 
safety, are now rethinking the “longer is 
better” approach to punishment. In the 
past five years more than a dozen states, 
starting with Texas and Kansas in 2007, 
have enacted comprehensive sentencing 
introduction
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and corrections reforms, typically shifting 
non-violent offenders from prison and 
using the savings to fund more effective, 
less expensive alternatives. Partly due 
to these and other policy changes, 2009 
was the first year in nearly four decades 
during which the state prison population 
declined.7
A new focus on Time 
Served
The prison population is driven by two 
factors: first, how many offenders are 
admitted to prison, and second, how 
long they stay. This report focuses on 
the second mechanism—time served, 
or length of stay (LOS), in prison. 
Understanding the length of time offenders 
are being held in prison, and how and why 
the time period has changed over time, 
is a critical first step toward helping state 
leaders factor LOS into their assessments 
of state crime and punishment policies. 
Earlier research identified national trends 
in how long offenders stay in prison, but 
little is known about how LOS varies 
at the state level. The U.S. Department 
of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
publishes an annual estimate of average 
LOS nationally, but there is no such 
resource for state numbers. A search of 
state Departments of Corrections websites 
revealed that fewer than half of the states 
publish publicly available numbers on 
LOS, with only five states providing such 
data going back more than 10 years. And 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics; Pew Center on the States, Public Safety Performance Project.
*Annual figures prior to 1977 reflect the total number of sentenced prisoners in state custody. Beginning in 1977, all figures 
reflect the state jurisdictional population as reported in the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ “Prisoners” series.  Data for both 
sentenced prisoners in custody and jurisdictional population are reported for 1977 to illustrate the transition.
1990:
739,980 prisoners
1925:
91,669 prisoners
Dec. 31, 2010:
1,543,206 prisoners
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2000 20101990198019701960195019401930
Prison Populations Double Over Past 20 Years
Figure 1
State and federal prison population has more than doubled in the past two decades.
1990 to 2010
+109%
*1977
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each state uses its own definitions and 
measures, which hampers comparability. 
Thus the first section of this report 
presents state-level estimates of how much 
time offenders spend in prison and how 
this has changed since 1990. 
Beyond that snapshot, it is also essential 
to understand how and why LOS varies 
among states. Time served is influenced 
by both front-end (sentencing) and back-
end (release) policy decisions—and to 
a lesser extent by policies and practices 
within prisons. Since the 1980s, states 
have adopted a wide variety of both front-
end and back-end changes that have 
lengthened LOS for the average offender.
In the second section of this report, we 
explore the factors that affect time served. 
We offer case studies of three states—
California, Florida, and Pennsylvania—to 
demonstrate the complexity of the issues 
and the need for policy makers to look 
beyond the big picture trends to uncover 
the specific factors at play in their states.
We conclude the report by exploring how 
time served relates to public safety. We 
present new research on whether current 
levels of time served are promoting safe 
communities in the most cost-effective 
way. It is important to note that higher 
cost is not necessarily a concern in 
itself. Longer prison terms may well be 
justified if policy makers believe that prior 
punishments simply were inadequate 
to reflect society’s need for retribution 
for the crime. But penalties typically are 
enhanced with public safety in mind, and 
an expectation that longer prison terms 
will reduce the total number of crimes that 
offenders will commit. When these are the 
goals, cost takes center stage and the key 
question becomes not whether increasing 
time served will reduce crime but rather, 
“What is the best way to achieve the 
greatest reduction in crime.”
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Length of Stay in States
Using National Corrections Reporting 
Program (NCRP) data collected by the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Pew estimated 
the average length of stay (LOS) for 
offenders released in each year from 
1990 to 2009 (see Figure 2). 
The NCRP gathers data from states on 
a voluntary basis. Thirty-five states, 
representing 89 percent of 2009 prison 
releases, submitted data in a sufficient 
number of years to allow estimates to be 
calculated. Details on the methodology 
are in the Appendix A.
Figure 2
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Time Served Changes Vary Widely Across States, 1990 to 2009
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defining Length of Stay
Length of stay can be measured in 
several ways. The most common is the 
“release cohort” measure, which we 
call the “average LOS,” and that is the 
primary measure we use in this report. 
Considerations involved in measuring 
LOS include:
Average vs. Expected LOS: “Average 
LOS” measures the average time spent 
in custody for offenders released in a 
certain time period, usually one calendar 
year. A second measure we call “expected 
LOS” looks at the inmates in prison 
during a given year and estimates how 
long those inmates are likely to spend in 
custody based on what percentage of the 
population exits prison in that year. The 
expected LOS will differ from the average 
LOS if sentencing and release policies 
are changing and inmates admitted more 
recently will be serving shorter or longer 
terms than their predecessors.
All Releases vs. First Releases: Prison 
populations in many states include both 
offenders serving time on their original 
offenses and offenders who served time, 
were released, and were returned to 
prison for a violation of their parole or 
other supervised release. Because parole 
violators may serve shorter periods and 
it is more difficult to compare these 
groups accurately across states, we focus 
solely on “first releases”—that is, people 
released from their original sentence for 
the first time.
Prison Time vs. Total Custody Time: 
Most prison inmates have spent some 
period of time in jail before being 
convicted and transferred to state prison. 
Because this jail time counts toward an 
*First releases only.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
Time Is Money
Figure 3
$2,593
Average cost of one month
in prison, FY 2010
9 months
Additional time offenders released 
in 2009 served relative to 1990
$23,333
Average cost of keeping 
offenders in prison longer
*445,688
Offenders released in 2009
(50 states)
$10.4 billion
Total state cost of 
keeping offenders 
released in 2009 in 
prison longer
x
=
x
=
Cost of longer time served tops $10 billion 
for offenders released in 2009.
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offender’s sentence, we also count it as part 
of an offender’s total LOS. When data on 
an individual’s jail time were unavailable, 
we estimated it based on the year and 
offense category.
All offenders
Pew estimates that the average LOS for 
offenders released from prison in reporting 
states rose by 36 percent between 1990 
and 2009 (see Table 1).8 Offenders 
released in 2009 spent an average of 2.9 
years in custody, nine months longer 
than those released in 1990. While nine 
months per inmate may not sound like a 
long time, even a relatively small difference 
in average time served can make a large 
difference for an overall population. For 
instance, considering only those offenders 
released in 2009, an average increase of 
nine months translates to cost increases of 
more than $10 billion (see Figure 3).9 This 
impact is magnified by successive cohorts 
of offenders serving longer periods; each 
cohort stacks on top of the cohort before, 
leading to greater overall growth in the 
prison population.
Among prisoners released in 2009 from 
reporting states, Michigan had the longest 
average time served, at 4.3 years, followed 
closely by Pennsylvania (3.8 years), New 
York (3.6 years), and Virginia (3.3 years). 
South Dakota had the lowest average time 
served at 1.3 years, followed by Tennessee 
(1.9 years), and Missouri (2.1 years), and 
North Dakota (2.0 years).
table 1
avg. time Served Estimates 
ALL CRIMES
1990 2009
Percentage 
change
AlAbAmA 2.2 2.9 28%
ARKANSAS 1.9 3.2 69%
CAlifORNiA 1.9 2.9 51%
COlORADO 2.2 2.9 33%
flORiDA 1.1 3.0 166%
GEORGiA 1.8 3.2 75%
HAWAii 3.7 3.1 –15%
illiNOiS 2.2 1.7* –25%
iOWA 2.2 2.4 11%
KENTuCKy 1.5 1.7* 12%
lOuiSiANA 2.8 2.5 –9%
miCHiGAN 2.4 4.3 79%
miNNESOTA 1.7 2.3 38%
miSSiSSiPPi 1.9 2.1* 7%
miSSOuRi 2.4 2.1 –14%
NEbRASKA 2.2 2.1 –6%
NEVADA 2.8 2.5 –14%
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2.4 3.1* 26%
NEW jERSEy 2.4 2.6* 8%
NEW yORK 3.5 3.6 2%
N. CAROliNA 1.4 2.7 86%
N. DAKOTA 1.3 2.0 54%
OKlAHOmA 1.7 3.1 83%
OREGON 2.4 3.2 32%
PENNSylVANiA 2.9 3.8 32%
S. CAROliNA 1.7 2.3 33%
S. DAKOTA 1.7 1.3 –24%
TENNESSEE 2.1 1.9 –6%
TEXAS 2.1 2.8 32%
uTAH 2.6 3.0 17%
ViRGiNiA 1.7 3.3 91%
WASHiNGTON 1.9 2.4 27%
WEST ViRGiNiA 2.1 3.1 51%
WiSCONSiN 2.5 2.9* 18%
NATIONAL 2.1 2.9 36%
* The most recent year of available data is 2005 .
noTeS: Time Served estimates are in years . ohio is omitted 
due to irregularities with 2002 data .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
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The overall change in LOS during the 
period from 1990 to 2009 varied widely 
among states (see Table 1). A few states 
saw very large increases, among them 
Florida (166 percent),Virginia (91 percent), 
North Carolina (86 percent), Oklahoma 
(83 percent), Michigan (79 percent), and 
Georgia (75 percent).10 Time served actually 
dropped in eight states, including Illinois 
(down 25 percent), South Dakota (down 24 
percent), Hawaii (down 15 percent), and 
Missouri and Nevada (down 14 percent). 
Nationally, the fastest period of growth 
in time served came between 1995 and 
2000. In that period, LOS rose 28 percent, 
compared with less than 5 percent in 
the five-year periods before and after. 
Most states mirrored this pattern, with 
rapid growth in the late 1990s followed 
by moderate growth or leveling off. The 
most variation between states occurred 
in the early 2000s, after some states had 
experienced rapid growth. The differences 
narrowed in the past five years, as the 
others caught up.
In order to explain the interstate 
variation in LOS, Pew classified offenders 
into three offense categories—violent, 
drug, and property—and created LOS 
estimates for each of these categories 
* Includes some offenses that are not counted in violent, property, or drug categories.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
Overall Growth Hides Variation Among Offense Types
Figure 4
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in each state and year (see examples 
in Figure 4). Offenders not fitting into 
these categories (such as offenders 
convicted of quality of life and weapons 
offenses) were included in the total 
calculations but are not presented as a 
separate category.
violent offenders
Violent offenders released in 2009 served 
an average of five years in custody, an 
increase of 37 percent from 3.7 years 
in 1990. Some simple math shows the 
impact of that seemingly modest rise. 
Multiplied by the number of first releases 
of violent offenders in 2009, this cohort 
cost $4.7 billion more than had they 
served the 1990 average of 3.7 years in 
prison. This figure is less than half of the 
total cost of increased time served ($10 
billion) between 1990 and 2009, with the 
balance comprised of an increase in LOS 
for non-violent offenders.
Time Served 
Of all the violent offenders released 
in 2009, those in Michigan served the 
longest average time in custody, 7.6 years, 
followed by Hawaii at 6.2 years (see Table 
2). Alabama, New York, and Virginia 
were close behind, with released violent 
offenders in those states serving an average 
of 6.0 years. Offenders in South Dakota 
had the shortest average length of stay 
among the reporting states at 2.5 years, 
followed by North Dakota (3.0 years), 
Minnesota (3.2 years), and Nebraska (3.3 
years).
It is important to note that the violent 
crime category includes a wide range of 
offense types (see sidebar). The significant 
variation in sentence length and time 
served for the offenses comprising the 
violent crime category means that state 
averages will obscure important offense 
variation to a greater degree than among 
drug or property offenses. For example, 
the national average of time served for 
simple assault is 2.7 years, which is half 
the average for all violent offenses. On 
the other end of the offense severity 
spectrum, the time served for released 
offenders convicted of murder is nearly 
triple the figure for all violent offenders. 
DefININg VIOLeNT 
OffeNSeS
for the purposes of classification across 
states, the broad offense definitions used 
in this study are based on the most serious 
offense for which an individual is currently 
serving time . Crimes in some of the violent 
offenses category include but are not 
limited to:
n aggravated assault
n armed robbery
n child endangerment
n child molestation
n domestic violence
n extortion
n homicide
n kidnapping
n manslaughter
n rape
n reckless 
endangerment
n robbery
n simple assault
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It is important to note that the method 
of estimating average time served in this 
report includes data only from released 
offenders. Inmates still in prison and 
serving long sentences, including life 
terms, are not included in the calculation. 
Thus, the average time served of released 
offenders may understate the average time 
served for all offenders in the system. This 
is a critical consideration when assessing 
time served for violent offenders, who 
typically serve longer sentences. See the 
sidebar on expected time served (pages 
21–22) for more information on alternative 
methods of calculating time served for 
violent offenders.
Trends
Looking at how time served by violent 
offenders changed over time, Florida led 
the way among states with a 137 percent 
increase. Michigan followed with a 97 
percent jump in LOS, while prison stays for 
Virginia’s violent inmates rose 68 percent. 
Overall, time served for violent offenders 
rose steadily across the 20-year period, 
though some states saw sharp increases in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Within the wide group of prisoners 
classified as violent offenders, trends over 
time also vary greatly by specific offense. 
While the national average LOS for all 
violent offenses increased by 37 percent 
between 1990 and 2009, the average for 
convicted murderers nearly doubled. For 
all offenses discussed in this report, it is 
critical for policy makers to keep in mind 
table 2
avg. time Served Estimates 
VIOLENT CRIMES
1990 2009
Percentage 
change
AlAbAmA 4.4 6.0 38%
ARKANSAS 3.6 5.1 41%
CAlifORNiA 2.8 4.6 63%
COlORADO 3.1 4.6 49%
flORiDA 2.1 5.0 137%
GEORGiA 4.0 5.6 41%
HAWAii 5.5 6.2 13%
illiNOiS 3.8 3.8* 0%
iOWA 3.5 3.9 12%
KENTuCKy 2.5 3.6* 43%
lOuiSiANA 5.4 5.3 –2%
miCHiGAN 3.9 7.6 97%
miNNESOTA 2.4 3.2 34%
miSSiSSiPPi 3.9 4.0* 3%
miSSOuRi 4.9 4.8 –2%
NEbRASKA 3.9 3.3 –15%
NEVADA 5.8 4.4 –24%
NEW HAmPSHiRE 3.1 4.4* 45%
NEW jERSEy 3.5 4.7* 33%
NEW yORK 4.9 6.0 24%
N. CAROliNA 3.0 4.6 55%
N. DAKOTA 2.1 3.0 40%
OKlAHOmA 3.4 4.5 34%
OREGON 3.8 5.0 31%
PENNSylVANiA 4.1 5.9 44%
S. CAROliNA 3.3 4.0 21%
S. DAKOTA 3.2 2.5 –21%
TENNESSEE 2.6 3.7 41%
TEXAS 3.7 5.3 44%
uTAH 4.2 5.5 32%
ViRGiNiA 3.6 6.0 68%
WASHiNGTON 2.6 4.2 60%
WEST ViRGiNiA 3.0 4.7 55%
WiSCONSiN 3.5 4.8* 36%
NATIONAL 3.7 5.0 37%
* The most recent year of available data is 2005 .
noTeS: Time Served estimates are in years . ohio is omitted 
due to irregularities with 2002 data .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
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that the categories presented are aggregates 
of many offense types and caution should be 
used in drawing policy conclusions about any 
specific sub-category without undertaking 
further investigation. 
Policy Changes
The main mechanism states used to 
increase time served for violent offenders 
was to require that offenders serve a larger 
percentage of their sentences. Violent inmates 
released in 2009 from the reporting states 
served almost 80 percent of their sentences, 
up from about 50 percent in 1990. 
In the early 1990s, both time served 
and percentage of sentence served were 
flat. However in 1994, when the federal 
government created an incentive for states 
to implement “truth in sentencing” statutes 
requiring violent offenders to serve a larger 
proportion of their sentences, both percentage 
of sentence served and time served began to 
rise and continued to increase at about the 
same rate for the next 15 years. 
At the same time as violent offenders were 
serving a higher percentage of their sentences, 
average sentences were declining, from 7.4 
years in 1990 to 6.4 years in 2009, somewhat 
offsetting the trend toward increasing time 
served.
But this dynamic varied by state. In New 
York, both sentencing and release policy 
changes contributed to longer time served. 
Violent offenders served 60 percent of their 
sentences in 1990 and 68 percent in 2009, 
a 13 percent increase, while sentences grew 
from 8.1 years to 8.9 years, a 10 percent 
increase. Overall, in four states LOS was 
mainly driven by increases in sentence length, 
as opposed to 18 states where LOS was 
driven by increase in percentage of sentence 
served, and five states where the two drivers 
were roughly equal.11 Accompanying state fact 
sheets, available online, explore state-specific 
patterns in more detail.
Property offenders
Overall, length of stay for offenders serving 
time for property crimes grew from 1.8 years 
on average in 1990 to 2.3 years in 2009, 
costing an additional $1.8 billion.
DefININg PROPeRTY 
OffeNSeS
for the purposes of classification across 
states, the broad offense definitions used 
in this study are based on the most serious 
offense for which an individual is currently 
serving time . Crimes in the property 
offenses category include but are not 
limited to:
n arson
n breaking and 
entering
n burglary
n embezzlement
n forgery
n fraud
n motor vehicle theft
n sale of stolen 
property
n shoplifting
n trespassing
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Time Served
Property offenders released in West 
Virginia and Hawaii in 2009 served 3.2 
and 3.3 years on average, a full year longer 
than the national average (see Table 3). 
South Dakota and Tennessee tied for 
the shortest average LOS for property 
offenders released in 2009, at 1.3 years in 
each state, a full year less than the average.
Trends
The highest rate of growth was in 
Florida, where the increase in LOS was 
181 percent; Oklahoma (93 percent) 
and West Virginia (93 percent) also 
had high increases in LOS. But more 
than a quarter of states had an overall 
decrease in LOS for property offenders, 
including Tennessee (45 percent), South 
Dakota (23 percent), and Oregon (14 
percent). The wide variation among 
states could reflect changing offense 
compositions, in which more low-level 
property offenders are imprisoned, 
or a deliberate shifting of resources 
within prisons to make more room for 
violent offenders. Both possibilities are 
discussed further below. 
Policy Changes
Released property offenders served an 
average of 67 percent of their court-
ordered sentences in 2009, a significant 
jump up from 43 percent in 1990. Average 
sentences dropped from 4.3 years to 3.4 
years, illustrating that time served was 
table 3
avg. time Served Estimates 
PROPERTY CRIMES
1990 2009
Percentage 
change
AlAbAmA 1.9 2.4 25%
ARKANSAS 1.7 2.5 44%
CAlifORNiA 1.9 2.2 16%
COlORADO 2.2 2.6 16%
flORiDA .9 2.7 181%
GEORGiA 1.5 2.5 68%
HAWAii 3.1 3.3 7%
illiNOiS 1.9 1.4* –24%
iOWA 2.0 2.3 12%
KENTuCKy 1.2 1.5* 20%
lOuiSiANA 2.2 2.1 –5%
miCHiGAN 2.1 2.9 35%
miNNESOTA 1.4 1.6 16%
miSSiSSiPPi 1.5 1.7* 17%
miSSOuRi 1.9 1.7 –11%
NEbRASKA 1.7 1.7 0%
NEVADA 2.6 1.9 –26%
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2.5 2.6* 3%
NEW jERSEy 2.1 1.9* –9%
NEW yORK 3 2.7 –11%
N. CAROliNA 1.4 1.7 20%
N. DAKOTA 1.1 1.6 41%
OKlAHOmA 1.5 2.9 93%
OREGON 2.2 1.9 –14%
PENNSylVANiA 2.5 2.9 17%
S. CAROliNA 1.6 1.9 13%
S. DAKOTA 1.7 1.3 –23%
TENNESSEE 2.4 1.3 –45%
TEXAS 1.8 2.1 15%
uTAH 2.1 2.3 10%
ViRGiNiA 1.6 2.7 62%
WASHiNGTON 1.7 1.9 11%
WEST ViRGiNiA 1.7 3.2 93%
WiSCONSiN 2.3 3.2* 40%
NATIONAL 1.8 2.3 24%
* The most recent year of available data is 2005 .
noTeS: Time Served estimates are in years . ohio is omitted 
due to irregularities with 2002 data .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
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driven by changes in release policy rather 
than by increases in sentences.
These trends were not uniform across 
states; in 16 of the 32 states that reported 
sentencing data, sentences rose, including 
12 in which average sentences grew while 
percentage of sentence served fell. 
drug offenders
Drug offenders released in 1990 served an 
average of 1.6 years in custody, compared 
with 2.2 years in 2009, an increase of 36 
percent. At the same time, the number of 
drug offenders sent to prison grew rapidly. 
Without accounting for the change in 
admissions, the 2009 cohort cost around 
$2.3 billion due to the increased time 
served. Considering the cumulative effects 
of the change in LOS as well as the growth 
in the number of drug offenders admitted 
to and released from prison, the overall 
impact of drug policy changes on prison 
space used is significantly higher.
Time Served
Drug offenders released in Arkansas (3.0 
years), Hawaii (2.9 years), and Michigan 
(2.9 years) in 2009 served the longest 
average period in custody (see Table 
4). Meanwhile drug offenders released 
in South Dakota served an average of 
1.1 years, the shortest term among the 
reporting states.
Trends
Arkansas also had one of the largest 
increases since 1990, with LOS rising by 
122 percent for drug offenders. Florida’s 
drug offenders served nearly three times 
as long in 2009 as in 1990—a 194 
percent increase. Oklahoma also more 
than doubled its average LOS with a 122 
percent increase. Demonstrating a small 
counter trend, five states saw time served 
for drug crimes decrease during the past 
two decades, with the largest decrease 
in Illinois (a 25 percent decline between 
1990 and 2005).
The growth in LOS for drug crimes took 
place almost entirely in the 1990s, with 81 
DefININg DRUg 
OffeNSeS
for the purposes of classification across 
states, the broad offense definitions 
used in this study are based on the most 
serious offense for which an individual is 
currently serving time . Crimes in the drug 
offenses category include but are not 
limited to:
n delivery, sale, trafficking, manufacturing, 
or importation of controlled substances
n false prescription for a controlled 
substance or dangerous drug
n possession of drug paraphernalia
n possession/use of a controlled 
substance
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percent of states increasing LOS between 
1990 and 2000. In the 2000s, 55 percent 
of states experienced an increase in LOS, 
while 45 percent saw LOS decrease 
(although the average generally still 
remained above 1990 levels).
Policy Changes
In 2009, released drug offenders served 
a larger percentage of their sentences 
than in 1990 (61 percent as opposed 
to 42 percent). Average sentences rose 
from 1990 to 2001 and then began to 
decline, leading to a small overall decline 
in sentence length from 3.8 years in 
1990 to 3.6 years by 2009. This national 
decline was driven by Texas, Virginia, and 
North Carolina, where sentences for drug 
offenders decreased precipitously in the 
early 2000s. 
table 4
avg. time Served Estimates 
DRUG CRIMES
1990 2009
Percentage 
change
AlAbAmA 1.5 2.0 35%
ARKANSAS 1.4 3.0 122%
CAlifORNiA 1.6 2.3 41%
COlORADO 1.8 2.5 35%
flORiDA 0.8 2.3 194%
GEORGiA 1.1 2.1 85%
HAWAii 2.6 2.9 12%
illiNOiS 1.6 1.2* –25%
iOWA 1.7 2.3 33%
KENTuCKy .9 1.2* 34%
lOuiSiANA 2.0 2.1 7%
miCHiGAN 1.7 2.9 74%
miNNESOTA 1.1 2.2 99%
miSSiSSiPPi 1.2 1.8* 45%
miSSOuRi 1.5 1.4 –10%
NEbRASKA 1.4 1.6 8%
NEVADA 2.1 1.8 –16%
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2.0 2.3* 14%
NEW jERSEy 1.8 2.1* 14%
NEW yORK 2.5 2.2 –9%
N. CAROliNA 1.3 1.7 38%
N. DAKOTA 1.0 1.8 86%
OKlAHOmA 1.2 2.6 122%
OREGON 1.0 1.7 62%
PENNSylVANiA 2.0 2.8 44%
S. CAROliNA 1.4 2.2 57%
S. DAKOTA 1.0 1.1 15%
TENNESSEE 1.6 1.5 –9%
TEXAS 1.6 1.8 14%
uTAH 1.8 2.0 11%
ViRGiNiA 1.3 2.2 72%
WASHiNGTON 1.2 1.8 48%
WEST ViRGiNiA 1.4 2.3 66%
WiSCONSiN 1.6 2.3* 43%
NATIONAL 1.6 2.2 36%
* The most recent year of available data is 2005 .
noTeS: Time Served estimates are in years . ohio is omitted 
due to irregularities with 2002 data .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
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The length of stay (LOS) measure used 
in this report, the most common method 
for calculating time served in prison, is 
the average time served for all inmates 
who were released in a particular year. 
However, this is only one means of 
measuring LOS in prison and, when there 
is wide variation in sentence length or 
when offenders are serving a very long 
time, this method may underrepresent 
certain types of offenders in any given 
release cohort. For instance offenders 
sentenced to 25 years to life in prison 
are not counted in the average until they 
are released, perhaps 30 or 40 years after 
entering prison. 
The purest method of measuring LOS 
would involve tracking inmates over 
the full duration of their sentence. For 
instance, we could track every individual 
who enters prison in a given year from 
admission through release and count the 
total amount of time served. This would 
provide an accurate picture of how long 
everyone stayed in prison; however, the 
time horizon it would require to track 
every admission through their eventual 
release makes this approach prohibitive. 
Thus, statistical means are required to 
estimate LOS based on actual releases, 
attempting to account for offenders who 
have yet to be released. 
One such approach involves estimating 
the expected LOS of individuals who are 
in prison during a particular year. This 
measure accounts for offenders serving 
longer sentences who are less likely to be 
released in a given year, such as serious, 
violent criminals. This is estimated using 
both the stock population (how many 
offenders are in prison at the end of the 
year) and the number of offenders released 
from prison during the same year. (See 
Appendix A for details on methodology.)
The expected LOS measure found that 
violent offenders entering or remaining 
in prison in 2009 could expect to spend 
about 7.1 years in custody, more than 
two years longer than the average LOS for 
violent criminals released in that year (see 
Table 5). This difference is more significant 
in states in which a larger portion of the 
prison population is made up of long-term 
inmates. For instance, in Louisiana and 
Pennsylvania the expected LOS for violent 
criminals in prison in 2009 is 9.1 and 11.1 
years respectively, significantly longer than 
the 5.3 and 5.9 years served by offenders 
in the 2009 release cohorts for those states.
Looking at murder, Pew finds an even 
starker difference. The expected time 
served for murder in 2009 is 38 years, 
almost triple the 14 years served on 
exPeCTeD TIme SeRVeD
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average by murderers released in that year. 
In California and Georgia, states with large 
populations serving life terms, expected time 
served for murderers is more than 50 years, 
compared with averages of 16 and 20 years 
in their release cohorts.
For property and drug offenders, who are 
already cycling through the system relatively 
quickly, the expected time served calculation 
makes less difference. In some states, with 
a few long-serving drug and property 
offenders and a large population serving 
short stays, the expected time served for 
offenders in these categories is lower than 
the release cohort estimate.
There is no perfect measure of LOS. The 
release cohort measure inspires confidence 
because it counts actual time served by 
actual people. But research has shown that 
the expected time served measure generally 
gets closer to the average we would find 
if we could track each individual into the 
future.12 Unfortunately, states frequently do 
not collect the data necessary to conduct 
these analyses. States can improve their use 
of data-driven policy making by making 
sure they are collecting and publishing the 
information necessary to calculate different 
measures of LOS, thereby providing a better 
understanding of the sentencing and release 
policies in their jurisdictions.
exPeCTeD TIme SeRVeD (ConTinued)
noTeS: only states that submitted stock population data to the nCrP for both 2005 and 2009 were included in this analysis . Time served 
estimates are in years .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
table 5
average and Expected time Served Estimates, all and violent Crimes
All Crimes Violent Crimes
2005 2009 2005 2009
Average Expected Average Expected Average Expected Average Expected
ARKANSAS 3.0 2.7 3.2 3.8 5.1 5.7 5.1 8.3
CAlifORNiA 2.8 4.2 2.9 4.4 4.2 6.7 4.6 7.0
GEORGiA 3.4 3.9 3.2 4.0 5.8 7.2 5.6 7.7
iOWA 2.2 2.5 2.4 3.6 3.8 4.4 3.9 6.3
lOuiSiANA 2.6 3.7 2.5 3.4 5.3 9.0 5.3 9.1
miNNESOTA 2.3 2.6 2.3 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.7
miSSOuRi 2.0 3.0 2.1 3.3 4.8 6.5 4.8 7.5
NEW yORK 3.5 5.1 3.6 4.8 5.6 7.7 6.0 7.0
NORTH CAROliNA 2.6 4.4 2.7 4.3 4.3 6.4 4.6 6.3
OKlAHOmA 3.2 3.4 3.1 3.7 5.0 7.3 4.5 6.4
OREGON 3.3 5.1 3.2 6.2 5.0 6.3 5.0 8.3
PENNSylVANiA 3.7 6.2 3.8 7.3 5.9 9.3 5.9 11.1
SOuTH CAROliNA 2.2 3.1 2.3 3.3 4.0 6.0 4.0 6.2
TENNESSEE 1.9 3.0 1.9 2.8 3.7 5.1 3.7 4.9
TEXAS 2.6 3.5 2.8 3.2 4.8 6.8 5.3 6.2
AVeRAge 2.8 3.8 2.8 4.0 4.7 6.5 4.8 7.1
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unpacking the numbers: 
What Shapes Length of Stay?
Length of stay (LOS) is driven by a 
complicated interaction of crime and 
conviction rates and policies and practices 
within each of the three branches of 
government. These include criminal penalty 
statutes and the relative funding provided for 
prisons and alternatives by the legislature; 
sentencing policies and decisions by the 
courts; and release policies set by parole 
boards and corrections departments within 
the executive branch. States differ in terms 
of which factors are the most significant 
predictors of time served and how those 
factors interact. For these reasons, assessing 
the policies and practices that impact time 
served requires an examination of all stages 
of criminal case processing.
Crime and Conviction rates 
drive mix of Prisoners
At the most basic level, the average time 
served by the overall state prison population 
is driven by who goes to prison. If a prison 
population is largely comprised of serious 
violent offenders, average time served 
will be longer than if the population is 
heavily weighted toward drug and property 
offenders. Rising rates of violent crime, 
accompanied by rising arrest and conviction 
rates, will therefore lead to longer overall 
time served, assuming everything else 
remains the same. But a state’s offender mix 
also can be affected by deliberate policing 
decisions, such as a sustained crackdown 
on drug and quality of life crimes. If drug 
offenders are arrested as a result of strategic 
policing crackdowns, and then convicted 
and sentenced to prison at a higher rate, the 
overall average time served might decline, 
even with no change in the underlying 
violent and property crime rate.
Legislators Take the Lead on 
Sentencing Policy
In most states, legislatures are responsible for 
creating and approving changes in sentencing 
policy. Statutes establish the baseline for all 
criminal sentences, including the minimum 
and maximum terms, requirements for the 
percentage of sentence that must be served, 
and whether offenders can earn credits 
toward sentence reduction.
Beyond this baseline, states’ approaches to 
shaping sentencing vary considerably. In 
Texas and Georgia, judges in most cases 
have the authority to sentence anywhere 
within broad statutory ranges, which can 
stretch from probation all the way to 20 
years in prison and beyond. Some states, 
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such as Maryland, have voluntary guidelines 
that recommend sentences within wide 
ranges inside the statutory boundaries, and 
judges can depart from the guidelines without 
stating reasons. A few states, typified by 
North Carolina, have stricter guidelines that 
prescribe sentences within narrow bands 
unless the court finds and articulates special 
circumstances. Since the late 1980s, states have 
used sentencing policy changes both to drive 
up (California and Pennsylvania) and to restrict 
(Wisconsin, Oregon, and Minnesota) average 
time served.13
The U.S. Congress also has played a role at the 
state level, by creating incentives for certain 
types of sentencing policies. Specifically, the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 provided federal Violent-Offender 
Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/
TIS) grants to states that require violent 
offenders serve 85 percent of their sentences. 
While there is evidence suggesting that states 
would have enacted such policies without 
federal intervention, these grants helped 
accelerate prison expansion.14 Missouri is 
a good example of a state that overcame 
concerns about overcrowded prisons with 
the encouragement of the federal legislation, 
expanding capacity by 30 percent with the 
help of the grants.15
Courts, Prosecutors decide 
fate of individual Cases
Decisions about how to charge a defendant after 
arrest and booking can have a profound impact 
on future LOS in prison. In most instances, 
prosecutors have significant discretion in 
determining which charges to file. Defendants 
are frequently booked for a host of crimes 
and prosecutors prioritize offenses, a choice 
influenced by factors such as severity of the 
offense and quality of the evidence. While 
some charging decisions are fairly cut-and-
dried, others involve a process of deliberation 
within the prosecutor’s office. The outcome of 
that deliberation—whether a drug offender is 
charged with trafficking, sales, or possession 
with intent to distribute, for instance—can 
have a substantial impact on plea negotiations, 
sentence length and, ultimately, on time 
served. Moreover, many states have habitual 
offender laws with sentence enhancements 
that can greatly boost time served in prison. 
For example, in California, prosecutors can 
choose whether or not to charge certain offenses 
as a “strike,” making an offender eligible for 
prosecution under the “three strikes” law. (For 
more information, see the section on California.)
After the decision about what offenses to charge, 
prosecutors also have discretion to offer a plea 
package to the defendant. National estimates 
suggest that 94 percent of all criminal charges 
are disposed of through pleas.16 Prosecutors 
have flexibility in negotiating these agreements, 
and, depending on court rules, may agree 
upon a sentence in the plea process without 
involving a judge at all. With nearly every felony 
case being disposed of by plea negotiation, the 
impact on sentence length and time served 
cannot be overstated. 
While judicial discretion has been curtailed 
in many states during the past few decades, 
judges ultimately determine the disposition 
and duration of the vast majority of sentences. 
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In half of the states,17 most felony criminal 
sentences are indeterminate, and judges retain 
significant discretion to hand down penalties 
that are defined by broad statutory ranges.18 
While the parole board retains ultimate 
release authority in an indeterminate system, 
eligibility dates for release are determined 
by the judge’s initial sentence. In states with 
sentencing guidelines, courts sentence within 
smaller prescribed ranges of varying sizes, 
but can depart from those ranges when 
the case presents aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances. This can result in significant 
variation in sentence length and time served. 
Regardless of the specific sentencing system 
in each state, sentences typically vary, often 
widely, from district to district and from 
courtroom to courtroom.
Parole Boards make release 
decisions
In terms of back-end policies that influence 
LOS, the use of parole—whether it is available 
and, if so, how it is granted—is a major 
contributor to the variations in time served 
among states. In many states, release from 
prison is discretionary, governed by a parole 
board that develops criteria to assess an 
inmate’s readiness for release and sets a date. 
The parole board exerts significant influence 
on time served. Factors such as offense type, 
criminal history, program completion, conduct 
while in custody, and risk of re-offending are 
considered by parole boards when deciding 
whether to release an offender. In reviewing 
such factors, board members typically possess 
a substantial degree of discretion to determine 
the ultimate parole date.
In many states, year-to-year changes in parole 
policy, board membership, the board’s release 
criteria, and type of inmates who come up for 
parole review can have a profound effect on 
grant rates, thereby driving time served up 
or down. In Texas, recent changes to parole 
guidelines that have redefined risk categories are 
thought to have resulted in an increase in parole 
grant rates. In September 2010, the parole grant 
rate was 29 percent. By February 2012, that 
figure had increased to 42 percent, resulting in 
800 more offenders being released to parole in 
that month compared with September 2010.19 
In some cases, parole boards decide not to 
consider release until a certain percentage of the 
sentence has been served. 
Board members’ discretion is not the only 
dynamic that can influence the release date. 
If board members value programs that 
prepare inmates to return to life outside the 
walls, such as substance abuse treatment or 
literacy, they may postpone release until those 
programs can be completed. A recent survey 
of parole releasing authorities found that lack 
of inmate programming was the single biggest 
factor in delaying release.20 Other common 
obstacles to release include an offender’s 
inability to attend a review hearing; the lack 
of timely post-sentence and other investigative 
reports; and the absence of victim input.
Even basic administrative troubles related 
to parole boards can affect length of stay. 
Pennsylvania typifies this experience; at one 
point in late 2011 its board was short two 
members, leading to 800 fewer parole cases 
processed each month and a backlog of 
prisoners awaiting parole consideration.21
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factors driving LoS Changes
 1995 truth-in-sentencing/85 percent rule
 Tougher penalties, including 10-20-Life
  increasing incarceration of drug offenders 
and use of “Year and a day” sentences
Florida stands out among the states for 
the dramatic increase—166 percent—in 
time served during Pew’s tracking period 
and for the twists and turns in policy 
that influenced the numbers over time. 
In 1990, the average LOS by a Florida 
prisoner was just 1.1 years, the shortest 
among states (see Figure 5). It was easy to 
see why. Throughout the prior decade, a 
capacity crunch combined with court limits 
on prison overcrowding drove Florida to 
adopt generous policies on “gaintime” that 
reduced offenders’ time in prison. These 
included some credits that were automatic, 
rather than awarded based on program 
participation or good behavior. “We called 
it ‘walking around breathing time,’ because 
the moment an offender entered the system, 
he got 30 percent off his sentence,” recalled 
Amanda Cannon, staff director of the state’s 
Senate Criminal Justice Committee. As a 
result, inmates in that era served only about 
30 percent of their court-ordered terms.
By the mid-1990s, the national truth-in-
sentencing movement was at full throttle, 
and Florida—where outrage lingered 
over the murder’s of two Miami police 
officers by an ex-offender released after 
serving only half his term—was ready for 
a pendulum swing. Prison capacity had 
increased, the 1993 killing of a British 
vacationer had stained the state’s image as 
a tourist playground, and a group called 
Stop Turning Out Prisoners (STOP) was 
attracting a large following. STOP’s push 
for a state constitutional amendment 
requiring offenders to serve 85 percent of 
their sentence was blocked by the Florida 
Supreme Court. But in early 1995, the state 
legislature voted unanimously to enact the 
85 percent rule for all offenders, regardless 
of the crime.
Accompanying that step was a steady stream 
of bills that toughened penalties for specific 
felonies. These included longer sentences 
for sex offenders and murderers, mandatory 
minimum terms for home burglary, 
aggravated battery, and other crimes, as 
well as new penalties for violent habitual 
To help understand how the various factors influencing time served interact, it is helpful to 
look at the experience of individual states . florida, California, and Pennsylvania all had 
large changes in length of stay (LoS) from 1990 to 2009 . in each state, multiple policies and 
practices shaped the numbers in different ways and at different moments during the study 
period . Their stories illustrate the importance of looking beyond the overall figures .
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offenders. Perhaps the highlight of Florida’s 
escalating toughness was its 10-20-Life 
law, passed in 1999. The law imposed new 
penalties for possessing, pulling, or firing 
a gun during commission of a crime, and 
mandated terms of 25 years to life in prison 
for those who injured or killed someone 
with a firearm. Offenders sentenced under 
the law may not earn time credits to reduce 
their terms.
In addition to authorizing stiffer sentences, 
the Legislature in 1997 adopted the 
Criminal Punishment Code, which 
created greater discretion for judges in 
sentencing, increased penalties for many 
crimes, and made more felony offenders 
subject to mandatory prison terms. The 
revisions, along with the proliferation of 
longer sentences overall, gradually gave 
prosecutors greater leverage to negotiate 
plea bargains, which now make up about 
98 percent of case dispositions in Florida.
As effects of the new penalties and time-
served requirements percolated through 
the system, the average time served by 
offenders ticked upward. In 1995, the year 
the 85 percent rule passed, the average 
LOS for violent felons stood at 3.7 years, 
but by 2005, it had reached 5.0 years. 
Counteracting that trend, however, was 
an influx of offenders with comparatively 
short terms, whose arrival in the system 
helped push the overall LOS number down 
beginning in 1999. In fiscal year (FY) 1996-
97, for example, drug offenders made up 
22.6 percent of new admissions, but by FY 
2006-07 the proportion was 30.6 percent.22 
Moreover, between 2003 and 2008, Florida 
experienced a big jump in the use of “year 
and a day” sentences. This is notable 
because offenders sentenced to a year or 
less serve their time in local jails rather 
than in state prisons. These “year-and-
a-day” sentences often were imposed by 
courts under pressure to relieve crowding 
and costs in their local jails and included 
a large proportion of offenders snared by a 
Department of Corrections policy requiring 
“zero tolerance” for probation violations. 
The policy was revoked by 2008; but, while 
in effect, the number of violators sentenced 
to prison rose by nearly 12,000.
 
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
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factors driving LoS Changes
 1995 truth-in-sentencing/85 percent rule
 Tougher penalties, including 10-20-Life
  increasing incarceration of drug offenders 
and use of “Year and a day” sentences
Florida stands out among the states for 
the dramatic increase—166 percent—in 
time served during Pew’s tracking period 
and for the twists and turns in policy 
that influenced the numbers over time. 
In 1990, the average LOS by a Florida 
prisoner was just 1.1 years, the shortest 
among states (see Figure 5). It was easy to 
see why. Throughout the prior decade, a 
capacity crunch combined with court limits 
on prison overcrowding drove Florida to 
adopt generous policies on “gaintime” that 
reduced offenders’ time in prison. These 
included some credits that were automatic, 
rather than awarded based on program 
participation or good behavior. “We called 
it ‘walking around breathing time,’ because 
the moment an offender entered the system, 
he got 30 percent off his sentence,” recalled 
Amanda Cannon, staff director of the state’s 
Senate Criminal Justice Committee. As a 
result, inmates in that era served only about 
30 percent of their court-ordered terms.
By the mid-1990s, the national truth-in-
sentencing movement was at full throttle, 
and Florida—where outrage lingered 
over the murders of two Miami police 
officers by an ex-offender released after 
serving only half his term—was ready for 
a pendulum swing. Prison capacity had 
increased, the 1993 killing of a British 
vacationer had stained the state’s image as 
a tourist playground, and a group called 
Stop Turning Out Prisoners (STOP) was 
attracting a large following. STOP’s push 
for a state constitutional amendment 
requiring offenders to serve 85 percent of 
their sentence was blocked by the Florida 
Supreme Court. But in early 1995, the state 
legislature voted unanimously to enact the 
85 percent rule for all offenders, regardless 
of the crime.
Accompanying that step was a steady stream 
of bills that toughened penalties for specific 
felonies. These included longer sentences 
for sex offenders and murderers, mandatory 
minimum terms for home burglary, 
aggravated battery, and other crimes, as 
well as new penalties for violent habitual 
To help understand how the various factors influencing time served interact, it is helpful to 
look at the experience of individual states . florida, California, and Pennsylvania all had 
large changes in length of stay (LoS) from 1990 to 2009 . in each state, multiple policies and 
practices shaped the numbers in different ways and at different moments during the study 
period . Their stories illustrate the importance of looking beyond the overall figures .
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2010 report by the California State Auditor 
concluded that offenders sentenced 
under the three strikes law would serve, 
on average, nine years longer than they 
otherwise would have for their crimes.
Meanwhile, California has long struggled to 
provide sufficient rehabilitation and work 
programs in its prisons; participation in 
such programs is one way eligible offenders 
can earn a reduction in their time served. 
One study found that for offenders released 
in 2006, half had not attended a single 
rehabilitation program or work assignment 
while behind bars.24 Budget troubles create 
one barrier, and overcrowding means 
competition for slots and a lack of space in 
prisons, where even the hallways have been 
filled with beds. Violence, exacerbated by 
the overcrowding, also has led to frequent 
lockdowns, during which programs are 
suspended.
With the largest state correctional system 
in the country, California is currently 
in the throes of a major policy shift that 
will substantially lengthen the average 
time served by offenders in its prisons. 
Beginning in October 2011, the state 
began to divert thousands of incoming 
non-violent offenders from prison to 
county jails. This “realignment,” developed 
by Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr. and 
approved by the legislature as Assembly 
Bill 109, came in response to a U.S. 
Supreme Court order on overcrowding 
that requires the state to reduce its prison 
population by about 35,000 inmates by 
mid-2013. Because of the realignment, 
offenders’ average stay in prison is roughly 
12 months, mostly for drug and property 
crimes. Their absence from the population 
will create a heavier concentration of 
inmates serving longer terms.25
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
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“
I think if you had a list of all 
the potential factors that 
could drive up LOS in prison, 
California would have  check by 
every one of them.”
—Joan Petersilia, co-director, Stanford Criminal 
Justice Center
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Pennsylvania
factors driving LoS Changes
  use of jails to hold offenders with 
shorter sentences
  high-profile crimes leading to changes 
in parole board practices
  Alternatives for drug offenders
In Pennsylvania, the relatively long 
average time served by offenders in state 
prison reflects the Keystone State’s heavy 
reliance on county jails. In 2010, jails 
represented 33 percent of all criminal 
sentences imposed in Pennsylvania, while 
state prisons accounted for just 13 percent 
and the balance went to probation or 
other alternatives, proportions that have 
held steady in recent decades.26 “Clearly, 
that skews the offender mix in prison 
toward people serving longer terms, so the 
average length of time served is naturally 
longer,” said Mark Bergstrom, executive 
director of the Pennsylvania Commission 
on Sentencing. In addition, offenders 
serving life terms in Pennsylvania—about 
4,300 people, or 9.4 percent of the prison 
population—are not eligible for parole, 
and, until 2008, Pennsylvania inmates 
were unable to accumulate earned time, 
two factors that also increase time served.
Like California and Florida, Pennsylvania 
adopted increasingly tough penalties 
for felons through the 1990s, steadily 
nudging the LOS average for violent 
crimes higher. But in contrast to those 
states, Pennsylvania operates under an 
indeterminate sentencing structure, 
so its experience also has been shaped 
heavily by actions of its parole board. 
In the 1980s, the governor-appointed 
board tended to grant parole to most 
offenders when they had served their 
minimum term, barring misbehavior 
behind bars. But periodically in the 
past two decades, high-profile crimes 
committed by parolees have caused spells 
of increased caution on the part of the 
board, triggering a drop in the parole rate 
and thereby increasing the average time 
served in prison.
One notable episode came in 1995, 
when a paroled offender named Robert 
“Mudman” Simon shot and killed a 
police officer just three months after his 
release. During the previous year, 72 
percent of prisoners who were eligible 
and applied for parole received it, and 
it took just one vote of the five-member 
board to authorize. The year after 
Simon’s crime, however, the parole rate 
plunged to 38 percent, while subsequent 
reforms expanded the board to nine 
members and required five votes to 
parole violent offenders. Not surprisingly, 
the average LOS for violent offenders 
jumped five months (9 percent) in a 
single year from 1995 to 1996. The 
notorious case also prompted then-Gov. 
Tom Ridge to call a special legislative 
session on crime in 1995. Lawmakers 
substantially increased maximum terms 
for a wide range of felonies. 
PUTTINg The PIeCeS TOgeTheR: exAmPLeS from Three STATeS
Time Served: The high CoST, Low reTurn of Longer PriSon TermS 31
Meanwhile, Pennsylvania’s Commission 
on Sentencing adopted new guidelines 
in 1997 that continued the trend of 
escalating prison terms for violent felons, 
but also established alternative sanctions, 
such as treatment options, for many drug 
offenders. As a result, prison time served 
by Pennsylvania drug offenders began to 
drop from an average high of 2.9 years 
in 1998 to a low of 2.5 years in 2003, a 
change of five months or 15 percent (see 
Figure 7).
With tougher criminal penalties on 
the books and political sensitivity 
over the “Mudman” case on the wane, 
Pennsylvania’s parole rate eventually 
began to inch back up. But another 
highly publicized crime, in 2008, sparked 
another contraction. In this case, a 
convicted robber paroled after serving 
10 years of a maximum 12-year sentence 
shot and killed a Philadelphia police 
officer. The killing by parolee Daniel 
Giddings, just one month after his release, 
created a widespread public outcry and 
prompted then-Gov. Ed Rendell to order 
a moratorium on parole. While in place, 
the moratorium cut the number of paroles 
by 800 a month, driving Pennsylvania’s 
prison population up and extending the 
average LOS. The moratorium was fully 
lifted by spring of 2009, but it caused 
a backlog that slowed the processing of 
parole cases into early 2012.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
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The accurate measurement and analysis of 
the length of time offenders stay in prison 
has significant implications for policy 
makers interested in the scale and cost of 
their state’s prison system. Understanding 
length of stay (LOS) is critical for policy 
makers to answer two important questions. 
First, what policies help explain the current 
prison population and price tag? Second, 
how does the length of time an offender 
spends in prison affect crime rates? 
As discussed above, increases in time 
served over recent decades have been a 
major driver of prison growth, and the 
cumulative effect of extending LOS even 
a few months for certain offenses has a 
substantial effect on the prison population. 
The average cost of a day in prison is 
$85, so an additional nine months equals 
almost $23,300 additional cost per 
prisoner.27 The substantial impact on state 
prison budgets of additional months in 
prison is clear when multiplied out by 
thousands of prisoners.
However, the additional cost may be 
well worth it if longer prison terms 
effectively reduce the total number of 
crimes offenders will commit both through 
incapacitation and deterrence (see sidebar). 
The question for policy makers is not 
whether the total cost is high, but whether 
increasing time served is the most cost-
effective means of promoting public safety.
The most common and accessible measure 
of how effectively imprisonment reduces 
crime is the recidivism rate. Holding 
everything constant, if increasing LOS 
has been a beneficial policy intervention, 
offenders serving more time in prison 
should have lower recidivism rates than 
those serving less time.
But this is surprisingly difficult to 
measure. Offenders with different levels 
of time served are different in terms of 
their criminal histories, the levels of 
seriousness of their crimes, and many 
other characteristics that affect their 
probability of reoffending. In addition, age 
has been shown to affect the likelihood of 
committing more crimes; offenders who 
spend longer in prison are more likely to 
have aged out of criminal behavior by the 
time they are released.28 Because of these 
systematic differences between groups, it is 
very difficult to accurately identify whether 
differences in recidivism are based on the 
What do We gain from increased 
time Served?
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amount of time offenders serve or on the 
underlying characteristics that lead them 
to serve different amounts of time.30 While 
researchers have attempted to answer this 
question for years, they have not found 
any consistent effect.31
Several recent studies have attempted 
to account for these analytical 
problems by using sophisticated 
statistical techniques to identify 
offenders with similar characteristics 
who are serving different lengths 
of stay in prison. These more 
methodologically sophisticated studies 
still find no significant effect, positive 
or negative, of longer prison terms on 
recidivism rates.32
INCAPACITATION, DeTeRReNCe, 
AND LeNgTh Of STAY
Incapacitation: Reducing current criminal involvement by holding offenders in prison 
where they cannot commit crimes against the public.
Deterrence: Reducing the likelihood of future criminal involvement by increasing the 
punishment for the current offense.
There are two methods by which increasing time spent in prison could impact 
public safety: incapacitation and deterrence . incapacitation is a guaranteed method 
of ensuring an individual offender does not commit additional crimes . however, 
incarcerating people comes at substantial cost and the number of crimes averted 
by locking someone up will vary greatly by offender and offense type . deterrence, 
on the other hand, is a theory rather than a guarantee . deterrence theory suggests 
that offenders who are punished more harshly are less likely to commit crimes in the 
future because they will want to avoid the prospect of repeat punishment . 
The interaction between length of stay (LoS) and incapacitation and/or deterrence is 
complex . An increase in LoS will obviously result in an offender being incapacitated 
longer, but the additional weeks or months may be associated with a diminishing 
beneficial impact on crime rates . Additional time served also may be related to a 
declining deterrent effect and, in some cases, actually could contribute to criminal 
offending after release . This dynamic is the foundation of the argument that prisons 
are “schools of crime .”29 Thus, the return on investment becomes questionable . 
This underscores the need to subject LoS to a rigorous analysis, paying particular 
attention to key offender characteristics that may be correlated with an increased risk 
of re-offending .
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Looking to the Past to 
inform the future
While prior research has struggled to 
accurately measure the aggregate impact 
of LOS on criminal offending, there is 
promise in understanding the impact of 
time served by looking at past criminal 
offending trajectory patterns as a model 
for future outcomes. Researchers cannot 
predict future behavior with perfect 
accuracy, but they can create trajectories 
of individual offending behavior that 
will closely resemble what individuals 
might have done had they not been 
incarcerated.33 These modeled trajectories 
are created using detailed information 
on past arrest history and individual 
characteristics.34 Once created, these 
trajectories of individual behavior can be 
compared to actual individual behavior 
post-release to estimate the number of 
crimes prevented by incarceration—both 
those prevented through incapacitation 
and those prevented through deterrence.35
To explore this approach using data 
from states with different sentencing 
structures and practices, Pew collected 
incarceration and arrest data for 
release cohorts in three states: Florida, 
Maryland, and Michigan. Many policy 
makers, community members, and law 
enforcement professionals are justifiably 
concerned about any potential reductions 
in prison terms for people who committed 
violent crimes. As a result, the current 
policy discussion in most states focuses 
on reforms to time served for non-violent 
offenders. With this in mind, this analysis 
concentrates on offenders who were not 
incarcerated for a violent crime. Rearrest 
rates for this group of offenders varied 
greatly among these states; in Florida 
28 percent of offenders convicted of 
non-violent crimes were not rearrested 
during the three years after release, with 
corresponding numbers of 33 percent in 
Maryland and 57 percent in Michigan. 
The model trajectories described above 
are used to identify which of those 
offenders who were not rearrested could 
have been released some period of time 
earlier without any loss of incapacitation 
or deterrence. Rather than seeking to 
compare similarly situated offenders, this 
approach uses criminal history-based 
arrest trajectories for offenders in each 
release cohort as a counterfactual to 
predict what they would have done had 
they not been incarcerated, or had they 
been incarcerated for a shorter period of 
time. This approach allows us to evaluate 
how many crimes an offender would have 
committed had he or she served less time 
in prison.
Thousands Could Serve 
Shorter Terms without 
impacting Public Safety
Modeling future criminal offending 
using past arrest history and other 
factors permits an estimation of the 
impact of reducing LOS on public safety. 
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The initial step was to identify offenders 
in the 2004 release cohort who posed 
low risk of rearrest upon release. For 
this step a traditional risk assessment 
instrument was developed and applied 
in each of the three states. Among the 
groups of low-risk offenders, the next 
step was to use the trajectory models to 
identify reductions in LOS that would 
not compromise public safety.
The analysis found that a significant 
portion of the state prison populations 
could have been released sooner with 
no impact on public safety. Looking at 
only non-violent offenders, 14 percent 
of the Florida release cohort, 18 percent 
of the Maryland cohort, and 24 percent 
of the Michigan cohort could have been 
safely released after serving between 
three months and two years less time 
behind bars. 
As seen in Table 6, the model identifies 
different reductions in the LOS based on 
risk of re-offending. The amount of time 
suggested to be taken off an offender’s 
sentence could be thought of as the 
point at which an offender tips into 
being low risk. 
If the offenders in this analysis had 
been released on the schedule the 
model suggests, the prison populations 
would have been reduced by 2,640 
in Florida, 770 in Maryland, and 
3,280 in Michigan. Based on the 2004 
populations as estimated from the size of 
the current release cohort and its average 
*Detail does not add to total because percentages
are rounded.
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
MARYLAND
Thousands Could Serve
Less Time
Figure 8
In three states, a large percentage of non-violent 
offenders experienced no incapacitation or 
deterrent effect from imprisonment. Many other 
offenders experienced some positive effect at the 
beginning of their prison terms but reached a 
point when additional LOS provided no future 
incapacitation or deterrent effect.
MICHIGAN
FLORIDA
High-risk 
offenders
Prison provided 
no public safety 
benefit
No loss of additional 
public safety benefit 
from reduced LOS
Non-violent
release
cohort
3,532
67%
43%
72%
28%*
1,771
4,072
1,914
673
2,362
3,008
14,947
2,119
497
57%
33%
Non-violent
release
cohort
7,041
Non-violent
release
cohort
20,790
19%
14%
27%
30%
20%
9%
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LOS, these reductions amount to nearly 
3 percent of the average daily population 
for Florida, 5 percent for Maryland, and 6 
percent for Michigan. 
These reductions represent substantial cost 
savings in each state. While this model was 
not available and actually could not have been 
applied in 2004, if it had been, Florida would 
have saved $54 million, Maryland would have 
saved $30 million, and Michigan would have 
saved $92 million. 
No risk assessment is perfect. Some of these 
offenders, if released, would recidivate during 
the period before their original parole date. 
However these numbers are predicted to 
be quite small, with 8 to 11 percent of each 
group of non-violent offenders rearrested in 
this time. Among the offenders suggested for 
release by the model, 1 to 2 percent would be 
rearrested for violent crimes, accounting for 
0.04 percent of all violent crimes in Florida 
and Maryland and 0.2 percent of violent 
crimes in Michigan.
While the analysis indicates that some 
released offenders will commit crimes during 
the period immediately following release, that 
does not mean policy makers are powerless to 
stop them. Research shows that offenders are 
frequently at the greatest risk of reoffending 
table 6
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24 months 48 77.8 53.8 96 4.2% 363 94.8 70.8 726 20.1% 224 129.3 105.3 448 21.4%
18 months 74 52.6 34.6 111 2.7% 709 40.6 22.6 1,064 16.9% 85 61.7 43.7 128 23.5%
12 months 144 33.6 21.6 144 6.9% 882 33.4 21.4 882 10.8% 264 45.1 33.1 264 22.0%
9 months 273 21.6 12.6 205 10.3% 456 20.1 11.1 342 8.3% 654 28.0 19.0 491 15.6%
6 months 371 11.6 5.6 186 10.5% 402 16.4 10.4 201 5.2% 2,022 17.1 11.1 1,011 11.3%
3 months 106 7.3 4.3 27 2.8% 234 9.8 6.8 59 3.8% 1,112 10.6 7.6 278 4.6%
2 months 6 2.5 0.0 1 0.0% 31 2.6 0.0 7 0.0% 63 2.5 0.0 13 6.3%
1 month 6 1.5 0.0 1 0.0% 1 2.0 0.0 0 0.0% 48 1.5 0.0 6 0.0%
< 1 month 8 0.6 0.0 0 0.0% 2 0.0 0.0 0 0.0% 72 0.2 0.0 1 2.8%
Total 1,036 770 8.1% 3,080 3,280 9.3% 4,544 2,640 11.3%
noTeS: Table 6 shows, for each group of offenders that the model identifies for release before their original parole dates, their current LoS, their 
average LoS after the model’s proposed reduction, and how these changes would impact the Average daily Population (AdP) of the prison system . As 
suggested by the model, 371 non-violent offenders in maryland could have been released six months before their original parole dates, reducing their 
average LoS from 11 .6 to 5 .6 months . Because these offenders would have served six months less time, they would have reduced the AdP by half a 
year each, for a total change of 186 bed-years . The final column of Table 6 shows what percentage of these offenders would be rearrested within the 
period before their original release date .
SourCe: Pew Center on the States, 2012 .
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in the early weeks and months after 
release. Any adjustments to time served 
should be made in concert with policies 
and practices shown to reduce recidivism. 
These include beginning release 
preparations early in an offender’s prison 
term, providing comprehensive pre-release 
planning and support, linking the offender 
with services at the time of release, using 
a validated risk-needs instrument to 
target supervision levels appropriately 
in the community, and responding 
swiftly and certainly to violations of the 
supervision rules. The right mix of policy 
interventions coupled with a reduction in 
time served for selected offenders can be 
expected to reduce the already low risk of 
reoffending.36
If large numbers of inmates could serve 
shorter terms with little or no impact 
on public safety, policy makers would 
be wise to subject time served in their 
states to a rigorous analysis, focusing 
on identifying levels of time served that 
maximize crime prevention. For higher-
risk offenders, analysis could indicate 
a need for longer terms. The research 
in this study underscores that there is 
a point when offenders become a low 
risk for release and more time served 
does not result in additional crimes 
prevented through either incapacitation 
or deterrence. At that point, greater time 
served begins to provide diminishing 
returns in crimes prevented at a 
substantial cost to taxpayers.
What do WE gain from inCrEaSEd timE SErvEd?
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During the past decade, a number of states 
have undertaken reforms intended to 
stem the growth in length of stay (LOS). 
Some have taken steps aggressive enough 
to actually reverse the direction of time 
served for certain offense types. Recent 
opinion polling suggests that these reforms 
are being received well by a public whose 
priority is preventing recidivism, rather 
than indiscriminately requiring offenders 
to serve longer prison terms (see sidebar). 
Below we summarize a wide variety of 
recent changes to policy and practices 
that have been adopted by state 
legislatures; carried out within the 
executive branch by governors, parole 
boards, or corrections departments; or 
administered by judiciary branches. 
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 reclassifying offense Types
Several states have reclassified or redefined 
crimi al offenses i  recent years; such 
changes mp ct sentence length and, 
ultimately, LOS in prison. In many 
states, the monetary value of stolen 
goods necessary to trigger a felony was 
established decades ago and has not been 
adjusted to keep pace with inflation. The 
result is that someone can have a longer 
sentence for a property crime today for 
the theft of less valuable material goods 
than in the past. In 2010, South Carolina 
revised several offense definitions and 
increased the monetary value threshold 
that triggers a felony charge for certain 
property offenses. A number of other 
states—including Alabama (2003), 
Arkansas (2011), California (2009), 
Delaware (2009), Montana (2009), and 
Washington (2009)—also have raised the 
felony threshold dollar amount for various 
theft offenses. 
how States are modifying 
Length of Stay
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BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT fOR ReDUCeD NON-VIOLeNT 
PRISON STAYS
86%
Strongly Accept Total Accept
All the approaches examined to reduce prison time served are broadly acceptable to voters. 
Voters strongly support reducing prison time for low-risk, non-violent offenders for a variety of reasons:
For completion of programs 63%
85%To keep violent offenders locked up 62%
85%To re-invest in alternatives 61%
83%For good behavior 55%
78%To close budget deficits 45%
77%For age or illness 50%
86%
87%
Up to 6 months
Up to 12 months
A large majority of voters favors shortening prison terms for non-violent offenders by a full year.
“Allow non-violent crime inmates to be released up to 6 [or] 12 months early if they have behaved well 
 and are considered a low risk for committing another crime.”
58%
64%
Nearly all voters prioritize preventing recidivism over time served, even when prison time varies 
up to a year.
“It does not matter whether a non-violent offender is in prison for 18 or 24 or 30 months [or] 21 or 24 or 
27 months. What really matters is that the system does a better job of making sure that when an offender 
does get out, he is less likely to commit another crime.”
87%18 or 24 or 30 months 66%
SOURCE: On behalf of the Pew Center on the States, Public Opinion Strategies and the Mellman Group conducted phone 
interviews with 1,200 likely voters nationwide on January 10–15, 2012. The survey has a margin of error of ±2.8 percent.
State policy makers seeking to reduce prison costs while maintaining public safety often look to 
reduced sentences for non-violent offenders as a policy remedy . in 2010 and again in 2012, Pew 
partnered with leading national public opinion research firms to assess public support for a variety 
of such reforms . The research found widespread support for shorter sentences and alternatives to 
incarceration for non-violent crimes, especially when prison savings are reinvested in less costly 
supervision options .
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Drug offenses also have been a target of 
recent legislative reform, as states revisit 
their criminal code with the goal of 
establishing proportionality in sentencing. 
Frequently, lawmakers implemented these 
changes by adjusting the quantities that 
trigger different levels of punishment. In 
many cases, lawmakers kept penalties the 
same or increased them for more serious 
drug offenses, but reduced sentences 
for lower-level sales and possession. 
Arkansas (2011), Colorado (2010), and 
Kentucky (2011) passed reforms to better 
distinguish among serious drug trafficking, 
lower-level sales, and drug possession. 
This was achieved by revising quantity 
triggers for certain felony definitions and 
classifications. While relaxing the penalties 
for lower-level offenses, these states 
retained or enhanced the penalties for more 
serious drug offenses. In Colorado, some 
offenses were reclassified as misdemeanors, 
while Kentucky modified the penalty 
for simple drug possession and now 
allows courts to divert first-and second-
time drug possession offenders from 
prison through deferred prosecution or a 
presumptive probation sentence. Kentucky 
also eliminated sentence enhancements 
for second-time and subsequent drug 
offenses. The savings from modest changes 
to felony classifications can be substantial. 
In Colorado, these reforms were projected 
to save the state $1.5 million in FY 2010 
and $6 million in FY 2011. The legislature 
earmarked the savings for reinvestment in 
the state’s Drug Offender Treatment Fund. 
VICTIm ADVOCATeS 
SPeAk OUT ON 
TIme SeRVeD
more than 100 leading national 
and state crime victim advocates 
and survivors have signed on to a 
statement of guiding principles on 
sentencing, corrections, and public 
safety . one of the seven principles 
speaks directly to the issue of time 
served in prison:
“While it is important for 
offenders to receive just 
punishment, the quantity of 
time that convicted offenders 
serve under any form of 
correctional supervision must 
be balanced with the quality of 
evidence-based assessment, 
treatment, programming and 
supervision they receive that can 
change their criminal behavior 
and thinking and reduce 
the likelihood that they will 
commit future crimes. For many 
offenses and offenders, shorter 
prison terms are acceptable 
if the resulting cost savings 
are reinvested in evidence-
based programs that reduce 
recidivism.”
The full text of the principles and a 
list of the signatories is available here . 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.
org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/
Initiatives/PSPP/Pew_Guiding_
Principles_for_Crime_Victims_and_
Survivors.pdf
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  mending mandatory 
min mum S ntencing 
Laws
As discussed earlier in the report, 
mandatory inimum sentencing has 
been a hallmark of efforts to extend time 
served in recent decades. Legislatures 
that passed these laws were seeking to 
add both severity to sentence length and 
predictability to the sentencing process. 
More recently, some states have begun 
to roll back their mandatory minimum 
laws following criticism that they block 
appropriate judicial discretion and cost 
too much. New York’s “Rockefeller Drug 
Laws” are some of the oldest and most 
widely known mandatory sentencing 
laws, dating back to 1973. In 2009, 
the legislature eliminated mandatory 
minimums for certain first- and second-
time non-violent drug offenses. The state 
also reduced minimum penalties for 
specific felonies and gave judges authority 
to retroactively modify sentences for 
about 1,500 offenders.
While the Rockefeller Drug Laws may 
represent the most high-profile reform 
of mandatory minimum sentences in 
the past decade, reforms in Michigan 
may have been the most far-reaching. 
In 2002, the legislature repealed most 
mandatory minimums for drug offenders, 
shifting drug sentencing to the state 
guidelines. This change was estimated 
to save $41 million in the year following 
passage. Approximately 1,200 offenders 
in Michigan prisons became eligible for 
parole upon adoption of the law, while 
another 7,000 individuals were eligible 
for release from lifetime probation after 
completing five years of supervision. 
Delaware (2003), Indiana (2001), and 
Minnesota (2009) also have amended 
various mandatory minimum drug 
sentencing laws.
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Sentencing
While many of the efforts to address LOS 
in prison occur within the legislature or 
executive branch, changes in court case 
processing also have influenced sentence 
length and time served. The Virginia 
Criminal Sentencing Commission 
(VCSC), for instance, developed a 
risk assessment instrument to identify 
candidates for diversion among non-
violent offenders. The instrument helps 
the VCSC meet a statutory goal of 
diverting 25 percent of property and drug 
offenders who otherwise would have been 
incarcerated. These alternative sentences 
can include intensive probation, home 
incarceration, electronic monitoring, day 
reporting centers, and fines. The statistical 
risk assessment provides estimates of 
the likelihood an offender will commit 
future crimes based on a number of 
factors, including offender characteristics, 
details of the current offense, and 
adult and juvenile criminal history. An 
evaluation of the risk instrument by the 
National Center for State Courts and the 
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VCSC found that it has proven to be a 
reliable predictor of recidivism and that 
Virginia’s approach has saved money by 
reducing the number of offenders who 
otherwise would have been sentenced to 
prison.37 A number of other states also 
have established a risk-based sentencing 
system and are in various stages of 
implementation.38
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opportun ties
In addition to focusing on laws that 
change the initial sentence length, states 
also are creating new opportunities for 
offenders to earn reductions in their 
time served in prison. Kansas (2007) 
and Colorado (2009) expanded earned 
time for offenders who participate in 
programs and avoid major disciplinary 
violations. In Colorado, during the first 
three years of implementation, the reform 
was expected to save $12 million, which 
will be reinvested in recidivism-reduction 
programs beginning in 2012. In South 
Carolina (2010), legislators required that 
non-violent offenders serving a minimum 
of two years in prison be released to 
mandatory supervision 180 days prior to 
release, rather than serving out every last 
day of their sentences and returning to 
the community with no supervision.
Pennsylvania took a different approach 
to reducing LOS, moving the certainty 
of a reduction in time served to the 
sentencing phase. The “recidivism risk-
reduction incentive” (RRRI) law gives a 
judge the option of sentencing certain 
offenders to a shorter “risk reduction” 
term of incarceration if they participate 
in programming while in prison. 
A 2012 report by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections found 
that 8,076 admissions (26 percent) 
were admitted with a RRRI minimum 
sentence and 3,466 have been 
subsequently released.39 Of those 
persons released, 72 percent have 
fulfilled all of the obligations necessary 
to be released at the RRRI minimum 
sentence. The slight reduction in time 
served is estimated to have saved the 
state approximately $37.1 million, 
while reducing the prison population 
by an estimated 1,628 offenders.
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and Practice
In many states, the parole board has a 
significant impact on LOS, controlling 
the back-end release decision within 
parameters typically set by the 
legislature. In some states, policy makers 
are taking steps to amend parole policies 
in ways that can affect time served in 
prison. Mississippi (2008) lawmakers 
amended their “truth-in-sentencing” 
law to allow non-violent offenders to 
apply for parole release after serving 25 
percent of their sentence. The prior law 
had required that all prisoners serve 
85 percent of their sentence before 
becoming eligible for parole. 
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In Georgia, the State Board of Pardons 
and Paroles in 1998 established a rule 
that inmates convicted of any of 20 
serious violent crimes must serve 90 
percent of their court-ordered sentences. 
Seven years later, while revising its 
release guidelines and under legal 
challenges to the rule, the board shifted 
to a risk-based policy. The new release 
guidelines call for low-risk inmates 
to serve at least 65 percent of their 
sentences and medium-risk inmates 
to serve 75 percent, while high-risk 
prisoners remain at the 90 percent level.
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  making Admi istrative 
Changes to Parole
Parole boards may lengthen time served 
for administrative rather than for policy 
reasons, as the number of offenders 
eligible for review sometimes can 
overwhelm the resources necessary to 
process cases. This logjam can make the 
parole review process highly inefficient, 
but there are steps state officials have 
taken to streamline the process. In 2003, 
Alabama temporarily created a second 
parole board to address a backlog in 
applications and help relieve prison 
overcrowding. South Carolina (2010) 
sought to professionalize its parole board 
by increasing training requirements for 
board members. The state also increased 
standardization of the review process 
when it adopted a requirement that a 
validated risk and needs assessment be 
used for release decisions. 
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While time served usually is controlled 
on the back end by release decisions, 
how states address probation and parole 
revocations has a demonstrable impact 
on the prison population. Some states 
have taken steps to reduce time served 
by placing caps on how long someone 
can serve in prison due to a revocation 
of supervision. Colorado (2010) placed 
a 180-day cap on the length of time 
non-violent parolees can stay in prison 
for a technical violation. This reform is 
estimated to save the state $4.7 million 
annually, which will be reinvested 
in reentry services for parolees. 
Alabama (2010) took a similar step for 
probationers, capping the length of stay 
at 90 days for non-violent probationers 
who met the conditions of supervision 
for a six-month period but were 
subsequently revoked to prison. The 
reform was retroactive and estimated to 
impact 1,500 offenders in prison.
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Conclusion
Twenty years ago, there was little evidence 
to counter the logic that longer prison 
sentences were the most effective way to 
combat crime and keep communities safe. 
As a result, states adopted increasingly 
tougher penalties for all categories of 
offenders, prison populations exploded, 
and correctional costs soared. Since that 
era, a wave of research has revealed the 
shortcomings of that strategy for lower-
level offenders, and the public increasingly 
favors alternative approaches proven to 
reduce recidivism.
Fortunately, policy makers in every region 
of the country now have a long list of 
colleagues who have found solutions that 
help to balance their budgets without 
sacrificing public safety. These bipartisan 
efforts across the country are not wild 
experiments that put the public at risk. 
Rather, they are grounded in research, 
time-tested, and overdue.
The analysis in this study shows that 
there are more savings that can be 
garnered by thoughtfully addressing 
sentence length and release decisions. 
With the right risk assessment tools and 
a careful evaluation of the dynamics 
influencing their prison populations, 
states can move with confidence down 
this new path—one that recognizes that 
simply putting as many people in prison 
for as long as possible is not the best 
way to spend public dollars and protect 
public safety.
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data
This study relies primarily on data from the 
National Corrections Reporting Program 
(NCRP) modules on prison releases and 
prison standing populations. The NCRP is 
a voluntary program through which states 
submit records for each admission and 
release from prison over the course of a 
calendar year. While each record represents 
a person, individuals are not identified in 
the record and may be present twice in 
an admission or release file. NCRP data 
are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau 
and cleaned and reviewed by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (BJS). They are housed 
for public use at the National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data (NACJD), part of the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political 
and Social Research. Pew submitted a 
request to the NACJD and received NCRP 
data from 1985 through 2009, with the 
exception of a few years for which data 
were not available.
After cleaning the data and applying filters 
as discussed below, Pew identified 36 
states with sufficient data in the NCRP 
to make estimates for the period 1990 
to 2009 (35 states excluding Maryland, 
which, although it had full data, did not 
contain admissions data and therefore 
could not be directly compared with the 
others). A list of these states is available at 
pewstates.org/publicsafety.
To check the reliability of the NCRP 
data, Pew compared it to other 
published sources of information on 
prison populations and releases. NCRP 
reports custody counts, meaning that it 
includes records for all persons entering 
and exiting the state prison system, 
regardless of the jurisdiction under 
which they were sentenced. This may 
be partially responsible for substantial 
variation between the NCRP and other 
published state numbers (the most widely 
used source of aggregate numbers for 
state prison admissions, releases, and 
populations are the National Prisoner 
Statistics [NPS] series from the BJS, which 
report jurisdiction counts) identified by 
John F. Pfaff in his 2009 paper on time 
served in prison.40
Nevertheless, Pew compared total releases 
by state from the NCRP with release 
numbers published in the NPS for the 
years 1988 to 2009. In addition, Pew 
appendix a: Estimating Length 
of Stay by State
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compared stock population numbers to 
NPS population numbers from 2005 and 
2009. Overall, states reporting in the 2009 
NCRP provide 3 percent higher release 
numbers than are reported in the NPS, 
and 2 percent lower population numbers.
Pew found substantial variation between 
NCRP and NPS total release numbers by 
state. In four states (Alaska, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina) these 
discrepancies were significantly reduced 
when individuals with sentences less than 
a year were removed from the release 
cohort, indicating that they were probably 
due to states submitting information 
from unified prison/jail systems to NCRP. 
Pew identified an additional four states 
(Arkansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, and 
Texas) in which the NPS 2005 Mid-Year 
Report showed substantial variation 
between prison population custody counts 
and jurisdiction counts, indicating that 
the structure of these state systems and/
or custody arrangements in the states 
may have contributed to variation in 
the custody and jurisdiction release 
numbers as well. Of the 36 states Pew 
used in the analysis, this left three with 
substantial variation between NCRP 
and NPS numbers (Georgia, Iowa, and 
Washington). 
Washington was the only remaining 
problem state that also shows 
discrepancies in the stock population 
counts. When comparing NCRP 
population data from 2005 with NPS 
custody and jurisdiction data, Pew 
confirmed that the NCRP counts in Texas 
and Minnesota more closely matched 
NPS custody counts than jurisdiction 
counts (with the Texas count matching 
very closely). Arkansas NCRP population 
counts showed discrepancies with both 
forms of NPS counts, and will bear further 
scrutiny as well. Mississippi did not report 
stock population data in 2005 and so 
cannot be directly compared.
In the early stages of the project, 
Pew surveyed state departments of 
corrections to determine whether gaps 
in the NCRP could be filled directly 
by states. While survey questions and 
definitions were written to match 
NCRP data collection, the aggregate 
data submitted were not, ultimately, 
comparable to NCRP results due to 
difficulty in precisely matching filters, 
queries, and offense categories.
methodology
Pew estimated average (mean) sentence 
length, average time served, and average 
percentage of maximum sentence served 
by exit cohort for each available year of 
data from 1990 to 2009. These numbers 
were estimated by state and offense 
category.
Pew also calculated the expected time 
served for 2005 and 2009 using the 
reciprocal of the exit rate as suggested by 
Patterson and Preston.41
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Pew was primarily interested in time 
served by people sentenced to state prison 
and released for the first time on the 
current sentence (as opposed to people 
who had served their sentence, been 
released, and were re-incarcerated for a 
parole violation). This group is generally 
referred to as “first releases.” To limit the 
analysis to first releases, Pew:
n Dropped all records for which total 
sentence (variable 34) was shorter 
than 12 months in order to exclude 
offenders who served a jail sentence 
rather than a prison sentence but 
were submitted to NCRP because of 
unified jail/prison systems in some 
states.42
n Dropped all records in which 
admission type (variable 16) was 
not court commitment or probation 
revocation (for most years there 
are multiple codes for probation 
revocation including “Suspended 
sentence imposed” “Probation 
revocation with new sentence” 
“Probation revocation with no new 
sentence” “Probation revocation, no 
information regarding new sentence” 
and “Probation status, pending 
revocation”).
Admission type was missing in certain 
states and years. In these states, Pew 
imputed admission type using a logit 
regression of admission type on offense 
category and time served in prison in a 
year with complete admissions data to 
predict whether individual records were 
likely to be new court commitments or 
parole commitments. The predicted value 
from the logit model was used to weight 
records when calculating time served 
and percentage of sentence served, so 
that records that were more likely to be 
first releases were given greater weight 
in the calculation than records that were 
more likely to be returned parolees. This 
imputation was completed for records 
in Mississippi, Nevada, New York, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Texas. See jurisdiction notes for the 
specific years for which admissions data 
were imputed in these states. Admission 
type could not be imputed in Maryland 
because there were no years in which 
admission type was reported.
All records were then divided into four 
offense categories defined as: violent, 
property, drug, and other. Offenders were 
placed in an offense category based on 
the crime for which they received the 
longest sentence (variable 32). These 
offense categories were mutually exclusive, 
and were based on the NCRP codebooks 
for the years in question. A list of NCRP 
offense codes from the 2009 NCRP 
codebook, grouped by offense category, 
is available upon request. In addition, 
Pew created a flag for records in which 
the offense with the longest sentence was 
murder or homicide. This is a subset of the 
violent offense category.
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Pew then did the following calculations for 
each record:
Total sentence length
n Sentence length refers to the 
maximum sentence that an offender 
may be required to serve for the 
most serious offense. In the NCRP 
data we used total sentence length 
as calculated by BJS (variable 34). 
This usually equals the maximum 
sentence for the offense with the 
longest possible sentence (variable 
33). In some cases the total sentence 
is higher, presumably reflecting 
multiple offenses to be served 
consecutively.
n If variable 34 (total sentence) was 
missing, we replaced it with variable 
33 (maximum sentence).
n Sentences longer than 1,500 months 
(125 years) in variable 34 were 
replaced by variable 33 if the value 
was different and less than 1,500 
months. If variable 33 was also over 
1,500 months or was missing, these 
sentences were marked as missing 
and were not used in calculations.
n Life sentences were counted as 30 
years or 360 months.
Total time served
n Total time served = Time served on 
current admission (as measured by 
difference between admission date 
and release date) (variable 62) + 
Prior jail time served credited to the 
current sentence (variable 24).
n If prior jail time is missing, we 
imputed it as the mean of jail time 
for that year and offense category and 
flagged the record. The year with the 
most missing jail time records was 
1990, when 32 percent of records 
had imputed jail time. This number 
went as low as 5 percent in 1998. 
On average across years, about 19 
percent of records required this 
imputation.
Percentage of sentence served
n Percentage of sentence served was 
calculated as total time served 
divided by total sentence as defined 
above.
n Percentage of sentence served was 
allowed to be above 100 percent. 
To create yearly estimates for each state/
year/offense category combination from 
1990 to 2009, we used a centered moving 
average within each state and offense 
category comprising one year before, 
the current year, and one year in the 
future. If one of these time periods was 
unavailable, the other two were still used. 
If two or more were unavailable, we used 
any periods available within two years on 
either side of the year in question. Though 
we created estimates only for 1990 on, we 
used 1989 data when available to create 
1990 estimates.
The later years posed a problem because 
we had available only 2005, 2008, and 
2009. To be as conservative as possible 
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while bridging this gap, we calculated 
2005 estimates using 2004, 2005, and 
2008; 2008 estimates using 2005, 2008, 
and 2009; and 2009 estimates using 2008 
and 2009. 
Standard errors were calculated using the 
entire three-year period upon which the 
average was calculated. If fewer years were 
used in the calculation then the standard 
errors will be larger (because they rely on a 
smaller number of records).
These moving average estimates by state, 
year, and offense type were made for:
n Sentence length
n Time served
n Percentage of sentence served
We estimated the number of releases in 
each year by offense category and the 
stock population in each offense category 
at the end of year.
n Count of releases = The number of 
individual records in the release file 
of the NCRP that fit the above filters.
n Stock population = The number of 
individual records in the stock file 
of the NCRP that fit the above filters 
(available only for 2005 and 2009).
Finally, Pew reviewed each state’s data 
looking for inconsistencies and outliers 
both in the individual-level data and in 
the aggregate counts and averages. Any 
problems with specific states, years, or 
variables were flagged for follow-up. In 
cases where data were systematically 
unreliable within a particular state and 
year, the problem variable or state/year 
combination was discarded and when 
possible replaced with estimates from 
other years.
expected Time Served
For the purposes of creating the expected 
time served measure, Pew weighted the 
total number of releases and stock to fit 
counts released through the NPS series. 
These may vary for the reasons discussed 
above (custody vs. jurisdiction) but 
because they have been independently 
validated, we believed they were 
more appropriate for the purpose of 
extrapolating totals. Thus we created a 
weight for each observation based on the 
ratio of the NPS total (either releases or 
stock population) and the NCRP total. 
These weights were created based on the 
total NCRP file (all releases) to match the 
NPS as closely as possible. NCRP files were 
then filtered as described above to include 
only “first releases” and releases and stock 
population totals were calculated using the 
weights created above. Because we looked 
at first releases, our totals do not equal the 
NPS totals, however ours were weighted to 
consistently fit with NPS reports.
Expected time served was calculated as 
the reciprocal of the exit rate, that is by 
dividing the weighted stock population by 
the weighted number of releases for each 
year and offense category. This measure 
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can be adjusted for population growth; 
however, this adjustment does not make 
a significant difference in the results and 
therefore was not used.43 To make it 
comparable to the average time served 
measure, which included jail time, Pew 
then adjusted the expected time served 
to include the average time spent in jail 
counted toward an individual’s sentence by 
year and offense category.
Standard errors for the expected time 
served measure were calculated using the 
delta method, which uses a first-order 
Taylor series approximation to calculate 
the variances of a transformed variable.
Jurisdiction Notes
Maryland: Had no admission type data 
for any year, meaning Pew was unable to 
exclude parolees. We therefore report the 
trends for Maryland but not the absolute 
values of time served.
Missouri: There were no data on time 
served for 2004, so it was estimated from 
other available years.
Mississippi: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 
2001. Each record in these years was 
assigned a probability of being a first 
release as described above based on data 
from 2002.
Nevada: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
Each record in these years was assigned 
a probability of being a first release as 
described above based on data from 2002.
New York: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. Each record 
in these years was assigned a probability 
of being a first release as described above 
based on data from 1995.
North Carolina: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2009. 
Each record in these years was assigned 
a probability of being a first release as 
described above based on data from 1992, 
1993, and 1994. Three years were used for 
the imputation due to small sample sizes.
Ohio: Due to irregularities in the 2002 
data, information from that year was 
dropped.
Oklahoma: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Each record 
in these years was assigned a probability 
of being a first release as described above 
based on data from 2005, due to issues 
with 2003 and 2004 data.
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Oregon: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1989, 1990, 
1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2008. 
Each record in these years was assigned 
a probability of being a first release as 
described above based on data from 1997 
and 2002.
Pennsylvania: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1994, 1995, 
1996, and 1997. Each record in these 
years was assigned a probability of being 
a first release as described above based on 
data from 1998.
South Carolina: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
Each record in these years was assigned 
a probability of being a first release as 
described above based on data from 2002.
Tennessee: Had no admission type 
information for the years 1989, 1990, 
and 1991. Each record in these years 
was assigned a probability of being a first 
release as described above based on data 
from 1995 and 1996 due to issues with 
1992, 1993, and 1994 data.
Texas: Had no admission type information 
for the years 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
Each record in these years was assigned 
a probability of being a first release as 
described above based on data from 2001 
due to issues with 1999 and 2000 data. 
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appendix table a1
Confidence intervals for time Served Estimates, ALL CRImeS 
Average 1990 Average 1995 Average 2000 Average 2005 Average 2009 expected 2005 expected 2009
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AlAbAmA 2.24 0.04 2.42 0.04 2.44 0.04 2.8 0.04 2.86 0.05
ARKANSAS 1.88 0.05 2.05 0.04 2.14 0.04 3 0.05 3.18 0.04 2.69 0.06 3.82 0.1
CAlifORNiA 1.93 0.01 2.03 0.01 2.57 0.01 2.78 0.02 2.91 0.02 4.18 0.03 4.38 0.04
COlORADO 2.22 0.04 2.35 0.04 2.53 0.04 2.89 0.04 2.94 0.05 4.07 0.09
flORiDA 1.13 0.01 2.64 0.02 3.37 0.02 3.12 0.02 3 0.03 2.33 0.02 3.09 0.03
GEORGiA 1.82 0.02 2.02 0.02 2.97 0.04 3.37 0.03 3.18 0.04 3.95 0.06 4.02 0.06
HAWAii 3.68 0.17 2.32 0.1 2.5 0.09 3.13 0.12 3.11 0.15
illiNOiS 2.21 0.02 1.98 0.02 1.69 0.02 1.66 0.03
iOWA 2.19 0.04 2.23 0.04 2.41 0.04 2.22 0.04 2.44 0.06 2.52 0.06 3.59 0.12
KENTuCKy 1.52 0.04 1.73 0.03 1.94 0.03 1.71 0.03
lOuiSiANA 2.79 0.08 2.44 0.04 2.74 0.06 2.64 0.04 2.54 0.04 3.73 0.06 3.42 0.05
miCHiGAN 2.39 0.03 2.98 0.04 3.49 0.05 4.07 0.05 4.28 0.1 7.41 0.15
miNNESOTA 1.69 0.05 1.91 0.05 1.87 0.04 2.28 0.04 2.34 0.05 2.63 0.06 2.51 0.06
miSSiSSiPPi 1.94 0.05 2.06 0.05 2.37 0.05 2.07 0.07
miSSOuRi 2.42 0.04 1.84 0.04 1.56 0.03 1.99 0.04 2.08 0.04 3.01 0.05 3.26 0.05
NEbRASKA 2.21 0.09 1.83 0.07 2.09 0.07 2.01 0.07 2.08 0.08
NEVADA 2.84 0.07 2.89 0.06 2.71 0.05 2.76 0.05 2.45 0.06
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2.44 0.12 2.44 0.1 2.79 0.11 3.08 0.16
NEW jERSEy 2.38 0.03 2.16 0.02 2.54 0.03 2.58 0.03 2.96 0.05
NEW yORK 3.52 0.02 2.47 0.02 3.16 0.03 3.52 0.03 3.6 0.05 5.09 0.07 4.84 0.07
NORTH CAROliNA 1.44 0.02 1.44 0.02 2.35 0.03 2.55 0.04 2.68 0.05 4.38 0.08 4.26 0.07
NORTH DAKOTA 1.32 0.09 1.33 0.08 1.5 0.06 1.45 0.09 2.04 0.14 1.87 0.09
OHiO 1.93 0.02 1.78 0.02 5.45 0.06
OKlAHOmA 1.67 0.04 2.07 0.04 3.17 0.05 3.25 0.05 3.06 0.05 3.38 0.06 3.7 0.07
OREGON 2.45 0.07 1.81 0.05 2.71 0.08 3.28 0.08 3.24 0.1 5.13 0.17 6.24 0.23
PENNSylVANiA 2.87 0.05 3.44 0.05 4.01 0.05 3.72 0.05 3.8 0.06 6.18 0.12 7.34 0.15
SOuTH CAROliNA 1.74 0.03 1.94 0.03 2.3 0.03 2.24 0.03 2.32 0.04 3.12 0.06 3.32 0.06
SOuTH DAKOTA 1.72 0.21 1.76 0.1 1.88 0.09 1.42 0.05 1.31 0.06
TENNESSEE 2.08 0.05 1.04 0.02 1.86 0.03 1.92 0.03 1.94 0.03 3.01 0.05 2.81 0.04
TEXAS 2.12 0.01 2.61 0.02 3.81 0.02 2.58 0.02 2.81 0.02 3.47 0.02 3.19 0.02
uTAH 2.57 0.08 2.24 0.07 2.7 0.1 2.64 0.07 2.99 0.1
ViRGiNiA 1.74 0.03 1.92 0.03 2.69 0.03 2.77 0.03 3.33 0.05 3.19 0.05
WASHiNGTON 1.92 0.04 2.06 0.04 2.12 0.03 2.14 0.03 2.44 0.04 4.33 0.11 1.19 0.01
WEST ViRGiNiA 2.05 0.1 1.79 0.1 2.04 0.1 2.66 0.08 3.1 0.09
WiSCONSiN 2.49 0.05 2.04 0.03 2.45 0.03 2.93 0.05 4.22 0.09
Tables A1, A2, A3, and A4 present estimates for every five years, by state and offense type. 
These estimates include 95 percent confidence intervals, calculated as described above. 
Expected time served also is included when it was calculable from available data.
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appendix table a2
Confidence intervals for time Served Estimates, VIOLent CRImeS 
Average 1990 Average 1995 Average 2000 Average 2005 Average 2009 expected 2005 expected 2009
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AlAbAmA 4.37 0.16 4.34 0.16 4.45 0.16 5.84 0.18 6.03 0.23
ARKANSAS 3.64 0.18 4.97 0.22 4.15 0.15 5.15 0.18 5.14 0.16 5.69 0.34 8.27 0.54
CAlifORNiA 2.83 0.03 3.03 0.02 3.73 0.04 4.2 0.04 4.61 0.06 6.7 0.11 7.05 0.11
COlORADO 3.07 0.13 3.5 0.13 3.8 0.12 4.4 0.13 4.57 0.17 7.12 0.34
flORiDA 2.1 0.05 3.74 0.05 4.79 0.06 5.04 0.07 4.99 0.08 3.81 0.06 5.24 0.1
GEORGiA 4.01 0.08 3.86 0.08 4.75 0.1 5.79 0.1 5.64 0.11 7.22 0.22 7.69 0.23
HAWAii 5.46 0.46 5.14 0.34 4.36 0.35 5.91 0.44 6.17 0.6
illiNOiS 3.79 0.07 3.66 0.06 3.48 0.07 3.79 0.14
iOWA 3.47 0.16 3.35 0.12 3.77 0.13 3.77 0.18 3.89 0.23 4.44 0.3 6.34 0.49
KENTuCKy 2.49 0.11 2.91 0.11 3.41 0.1 3.56 0.13
lOuiSiANA 5.36 0.27 4.56 0.14 6.54 0.32 5.31 0.18 5.28 0.22 8.97 0.43 9.06 0.41
miCHiGAN 3.85 0.08 4.75 0.09 5.91 0.11 7.29 0.13 7.57 0.22 12.17 0.48
miNNESOTA 2.38 0.11 2.69 0.1 2.78 0.09 3.14 0.11 3.18 0.15 3.56 0.16 3.67 0.16
miSSiSSiPPi 3.86 0.15 3.88 0.15 4.74 0.16 3.97 0.28
miSSOuRi 4.91 0.14 2.95 0.18 3.71 0.15 4.75 0.17 4.82 0.17 6.53 0.29 7.5 0.31
NEbRASKA 3.89 0.28 2.89 0.18 3.34 0.2 3.29 0.2 3.33 0.24
NEVADA 5.78 0.24 5.1 0.2 4.83 0.18 4.72 0.16 4.37 0.19
NEW HAmPSHiRE 3.06 0.37 3.5 0.27 4.06 0.23 4.43 0.39
NEW jERSEy 3.53 0.07 3.45 0.07 4.33 0.08 4.68 0.12 5.58 0.22
NEW yORK 4.88 0.05 3.61 0.05 5.04 0.07 5.63 0.08 6.04 0.12 7.74 0.21 6.99 0.19
NORTH CAROliNA 2.96 0.08 2.58 0.07 3.72 0.08 4.33 0.1 4.58 0.13 6.39 0.21 6.28 0.2
NORTH DAKOTA 2.11 0.31 2.01 0.24 2.14 0.18 2.18 0.28 2.95 0.45 2.66 0.27
OHiO 3.38 0.06 3.09 0.07 7.57 0.11
OKlAHOmA 3.4 0.15 3.74 0.17 4.99 0.16 5.03 0.16 4.55 0.17 7.26 0.36 6.36 0.28
OREGON 3.84 0.13 2.82 0.1 4.15 0.16 4.97 0.14 5.03 0.17 6.28 0.3 8.31 0.45
PENNSylVANiA 4.13 0.1 5 0.12 5.77 0.09 5.88 0.11 5.95 0.14 9.34 0.34 11.13 0.42
SOuTH CAROliNA 3.32 0.12 3.54 0.12 4.14 0.13 4.01 0.12 4 0.15 5.99 0.26 6.23 0.27
SOuTH DAKOTA 3.19 0.88 3.52 0.35 3.63 0.3 2.97 0.24 2.53 0.27
TENNESSEE 2.63 0.13 1.43 0.05 3.56 0.09 3.74 0.09 3.71 0.11 5.11 0.17 4.93 0.16
TEXAS 3.67 0.05 4.81 0.08 5.25 0.05 4.83 0.05 5.27 0.07 6.84 0.1 6.23 0.1
uTAH 4.21 0.19 4.25 0.22 5.22 0.28 5.17 0.23 5.55 0.26
ViRGiNiA 3.58 0.12 3.41 0.1 4.63 0.12 4.82 0.12 6.01 0.17 5.8 0.17
WASHiNGTON 2.62 0.08 3.01 0.1 3.44 0.09 3.78 0.11 4.19 0.14 7.78 0.45 2.14 0.05
WEST ViRGiNiA 3.03 0.23 2.88 0.28 3.62 0.29 4.24 0.26 4.7 0.3
WiSCONSiN 3.53 0.13 2.92 0.09 3.96 0.1 4.79 0.15 8 0.4
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appendix table a3
Confidence intervals for time Served Estimates, PROPeRty CRImeS 
Average 1990 Average 1995 Average 2000 Average 2005 Average 2009 expected 2005 expected 2009
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AlAbAmA 1.92 0.04 2.07 0.05 2.15 0.04 2.37 0.05 2.41 0.06
ARKANSAS 1.7 0.06 1.8 0.09 1.65 0.04 2.37 0.06 2.45 0.06 1.84 0.06 2.23 0.09
CAlifORNiA 1.87 0.01 1.68 0.01 2.3 0.03 2.14 0.03 2.18 0.04 2.57 0.03 2.52 0.03
COlORADO 2.21 0.07 2.37 0.07 2.27 0.06 2.56 0.06 2.56 0.07 2.62 0.09
flORiDA 0.95 0.01 2.34 0.02 3.22 0.04 2.88 0.04 2.66 0.04 2.19 0.03 2.15 0.03
GEORGiA 1.48 0.02 1.78 0.03 2.53 0.05 2.8 0.04 2.48 0.04 2.38 0.05 2.41 0.05
HAWAii 3.1 0.23 2.5 0.17 2.48 0.12 2.99 0.13 3.32 0.19
illiNOiS 1.88 0.02 1.75 0.02 1.44 0.02 1.43 0.04
iOWA 2.01 0.05 2.13 0.05 2.13 0.05 2.03 0.06 2.25 0.08 1.84 0.07 2.4 0.12
KENTuCKy 1.23 0.04 1.51 0.04 1.74 0.04 1.48 0.04
lOuiSiANA 2.24 0.08 2.02 0.04 2.18 0.06 2.22 0.04 2.13 0.05 2.62 0.07 2.18 0.05
miCHiGAN 2.11 0.03 2.45 0.04 2.56 0.05 2.86 0.06 2.86 0.1 4.49 0.16
miNNESOTA 1.39 0.04 1.38 0.04 1.32 0.04 1.57 0.05 1.6 0.06 1.28 0.04 1.31 0.04
miSSiSSiPPi 1.46 0.04 1.69 0.05 1.75 0.05 1.71 0.08
miSSOuRi 1.88 0.04 1.76 0.05 1.38 0.04 1.64 0.04 1.67 0.04 2.28 0.06 2.14 0.05
NEbRASKA 1.68 0.07 1.4 0.08 1.75 0.09 1.69 0.09 1.69 0.11
NEVADA 2.59 0.07 2.47 0.07 2.3 0.05 2.17 0.05 1.92 0.05
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2.54 0.16 2.2 0.17 2.27 0.15 2.61 0.2
NEW jERSEy 2.07 0.04 1.7 0.03 1.99 0.04 1.9 0.04 1.81 0.05
NEW yORK 3.04 0.03 1.95 0.03 2.5 0.04 2.61 0.05 2.69 0.06 3.49 0.11 3.66 0.12
NORTH CAROliNA 1.4 0.02 1.47 0.03 2.42 0.06 1.82 0.06 1.68 0.06 2.54 0.08 2.38 0.07
NORTH DAKOTA 1.15 0.07 1.29 0.09 1.51 0.08 1.35 0.15 1.62 0.09 1.50 0.11
OHiO 1.67 0.03 1.73 0.03 4.89 0.08
OKlAHOmA 1.48 0.04 1.86 0.07 3.49 0.1 3.1 0.08 2.85 0.09 2.43 0.08 2.66 0.09
OREGON 2.2 0.08 1.22 0.07 2.09 0.14 1.82 0.09 1.89 0.11 3.78 0.24 4.12 0.27
PENNSylVANiA 2.49 0.06 3 0.08 3.15 0.08 2.85 0.08 2.92 0.1 3.57 0.15 4.49 0.20
SOuTH CAROliNA 1.65 0.03 1.83 0.04 1.97 0.04 1.87 0.04 1.87 0.05 2.01 0.05 2.07 0.05
SOuTH DAKOTA 1.7 0.19 1.72 0.11 1.89 0.12 1.48 0.09 1.31 0.1
TENNESSEE 2.42 0.04 0.99 0.02 1.22 0.03 1.26 0.02 1.32 0.03 1.55 0.03 1.41 0.02
TEXAS 1.83 0.01 2.31 0.03 3.83 0.04 1.91 0.03 2.11 0.04 2.15 0.02 2.04 0.02
uTAH 2.08 0.07 1.74 0.07 2.03 0.1 2.02 0.07 2.3 0.1
ViRGiNiA 1.64 0.04 1.77 0.03 2.28 0.04 2.36 0.04 2.66 0.06 1.8 0.04
WASHiNGTON 1.72 0.07 1.68 0.05 1.56 0.05 1.63 0.04 1.92 0.04 2.8 0.14
WEST ViRGiNiA 1.68 0.1 1.47 0.12 1.53 0.1 2.6 0.1 3.24 0.12
WiSCONSiN 2.29 0.05 2.18 0.05 2.78 0.05 3.22 0.08 3.56 0.16
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appendix table a4
Confidence intervals for time Served Estimates, DRuG CRImeS 
Average 1990 Average 1995 Average 2000 Average 2005 Average 2009 expected 2005 expected 2009
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AlAbAmA 1.52 0.05 1.93 0.05 2.05 0.05 2.02 0.04 2.04 0.04
ARKANSAS 1.35 0.05 1.71 0.08 1.76 0.04 2.71 0.06 3 0.06 1.74 0.05 2.41 0.09
CAlifORNiA 1.65 0.01 1.8 0.01 2.08 0.02 2.39 0.03 2.33 0.03 2.43 0.03 2.26 0.03
COlORADO 1.84 0.07 1.77 0.07 2.05 0.05 2.44 0.05 2.48 0.07 2.44 0.1
flORiDA 0.79 0.01 2.21 0.02 2.46 0.03 2.3 0.03 2.32 0.04 1.29 0.01 2.14 0.03
GEORGiA 1.12 0.02 1.52 0.03 2.1 0.04 2.19 0.03 2.08 0.03 2.11 0.05 2.1 0.05
HAWAii 2.62 0.28 2.55 0.18 2.34 0.11 2.79 0.18 2.95 0.22
illiNOiS 1.63 0.03 1.47 0.02 1.2 0.02 1.22 0.03
iOWA 1.7 0.07 2.39 0.08 2.41 0.06 2.06 0.04 2.26 0.07 1.89 0.08 2.83 0.17
KENTuCKy 0.92 0.04 1.18 0.03 1.42 0.03 1.23 0.02
lOuiSiANA 2.01 0.07 2.01 0.03 2.27 0.05 2.27 0.04 2.14 0.05 2.47 0.06 2.2 0.04
miCHiGAN 1.66 0.03 2.35 0.06 2.69 0.08 2.8 0.09 2.88 0.17 3.9 0.18
miNNESOTA 1.1 0.05 1.43 0.08 1.38 0.05 2.08 0.06 2.18 0.08 1.74 0.07 1.52 0.05
miSSiSSiPPi 1.22 0.04 1.5 0.04 1.79 0.05 1.77 0.08
miSSOuRi 1.52 0.06 1.66 0.07 1.28 0.04 1.36 0.03 1.37 0.04 1.83 0.04 1.79 0.04
NEbRASKA 1.43 0.07 1.48 0.08 1.6 0.08 1.44 0.08 1.55 0.09
NEVADA 2.11 0.08 2.47 0.08 2.24 0.06 2.27 0.07 1.76 0.07
NEW HAmPSHiRE 2 0.12 2.03 0.11 2.02 0.15 2.28 0.18
NEW jERSEy 1.83 0.02 1.79 0.02 2.02 0.02 2.09 0.03 1.92 0.04
NEW yORK 2.46 0.03 2.06 0.02 2.41 0.02 2.56 0.03 2.24 0.03 2.61 0.05 2.23 0.05
NORTH CAROliNA 1.26 0.02 1.20 0.02 1.78 0.05 1.67 0.04 1.74 0.05 2.54 0.09 2.8 0.1
NORTH DAKOTA 0.96 0.09 0.99 0.13 1.19 0.09 1.2 0.1 1.79 0.12 1.3 0.07
OHiO 1.07 0.02 1.23 0.02 2.9 0.09
OKlAHOmA 1.19 0.06 1.65 0.07 2.84 0.07 2.73 0.05 2.65 0.06 2.3 0.06 2.66 0.08
OREGON 1.04 0.05 1.08 0.05 1.49 0.05 1.67 0.08 1.68 0.1 2.7 0.22 3.07 0.26
PENNSylVANiA 1.96 0.04 2.65 0.05 2.81 0.05 2.63 0.04 2.83 0.06 3.19 0.1 4.15 0.14
SOuTH CAROliNA 1.38 0.04 1.72 0.04 2.08 0.05 1.93 0.05 2.16 0.07 2.3 0.07 2.63 0.09
SOuTH DAKOTA 1 0.17 1.27 0.19 1.27 0.09 1.13 0.05 1.14 0.07
TENNESSEE 1.61 0.04 0.91 0.03 1.35 0.03 1.37 0.03 1.46 0.03 2.04 0.06 1.88 0.05
TEXAS 1.6 0.01 2.12 0.02 3.29 0.03 1.78 0.02 1.82 0.02 1.7 0.02 1.53 0.01
uTAH 1.77 0.08 1.48 0.05 1.68 0.06 1.74 0.04 1.97 0.05
ViRGiNiA 1.28 0.03 1.65 0.03 2.16 0.04 2.28 0.04 2.2 0.05 1.68 0.04
WASHiNGTON 1.21 0.02 1.64 0.03 1.71 0.03 1.6 0.03 1.79 0.04 2.32 0.09
WEST ViRGiNiA 1.36 0.13 1.16 0.09 1.44 0.1 1.91 0.09 2.26 0.11
WiSCONSiN 1.63 0.05 1.24 0.04 2.02 0.04 2.33 0.05 2.62 0.11
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Criminal history accumulation 
process (Chap)
To calculate an offender trajectory, Pew’s 
contractor Dr. Avinash Bhati collected all 
pre- and post-release arrest histories for 
three years for each individual released 
from state prison in 2004 in Florida, 
Maryland, and Michigan (these cohorts 
represent all releases, not first releases as 
in the findings above). This information 
included dated arrest histories for 
offenders with a recorded date of birth. 
These data tell the age of first, second, 
and subsequent arrests for an offender. 
This allows the measurement of elapsed 
time between successive arrests. Dr. Bhati 
also collected offender demographics, 
admission and release dates for the 
current incarceration, and outcome of 
the arrest (whether the arrest resulted in 
a probation term and/or an incarceration 
term). This allows him to develop a 
Criminal History Accumulation Process 
(CHAP), which is a means of linking 
the current risk of offending to age and 
criminal history—a better measure of 
criminal history than simply the number 
of prior arrests or even age at first arrest.
The observed arrest history can then 
be used to develop estimated future 
offending paths. This is done by adjusting 
arrest pattern data with the number of 
charges for each crime within an arrest, 
the crime clearance rate for various 
years during which arrest histories are 
observed, the crime reporting rate by 
age of offender and crime categories, 
co-offending rates specific to the offense 
category, and replacement rates. An 
adjustment, or correction factor, is 
employed to reflect the fact that not 
every crime is reported or cleared and 
that some incapacitated or deterred 
offenders are replaced in the community. 
For example, a person is arrested for 
drug sales and is simply replaced in the 
community by another individual selling 
drugs in the same market. 
An offending trajectory is then 
calculated. The pre-incarceration 
offending trajectory is considered 
the counterfactual: the trajectory 
that an offender would have been 
on had s/he not been incarcerated. 
A second post-release trajectory is 
calculated reflecting how the offender’s 
trajectory was deflected as a result 
of this incarceration. Comparing 
the counterfactual with the post-
release offending trajectory allows an 
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assessment of the extent to which an 
offender’s behavior has been modified by 
incarceration.
The example shown in Figure B1 involves 
a prisoner who was incarcerated at age 34 
for a period of three years. Using this past 
criminal history accumulation process, 
Dr. Bhati first develops an arrest trajectory 
(termed here as the pre-incarceration 
offending trajectory). According to this 
trajectory, the offender has approximately 
10 prior arrest records. Next, the pre-
incarceration arrest trajectory is plotted 
out over the course of his incarceration 
and through the follow-up period (three 
years in this case). This constitutes the 
counterfactual offending trajectory.
The prisoner is then released from prison 
at age 37. Using the available rearrest data 
for the following three years, Dr. Bhati 
estimates a post-release arrest trajectory. 
Two scenarios are depicted in Figure B.1. If 
the prisoner is deterred then the offender 
should accumulate fewer post-release 
rearrests relative to what he would have after 
netting out the incapacitation effect—i.e., 
if he picked up his career where he left off 
upon release. This is indicated by marker 
B. If he accumulated rearrests at a quicker 
rate than anticipated then we have a 
SOURCE: Pew Center on the States, 2012.
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criminogenic post-release trajectory. This 
is indicated by the marker C. Finally, the 
difference between the number of rearrests 
he would have accumulated had he not 
been incarcerated—the incapacitation 
effect—is indicated by the marker A. The 
net effect of incarcerating this individual is 
computed using A, B, and C depending on 
whether he is deterred or not.
This method is not unlike more commonly 
known risk assessment instruments, but 
with a key difference. Risk instruments use 
aggregate outcomes to inform decisions 
about release and/or classification for 
individuals on a case-by-case basis. 
Criminal trajectory modeling adds the 
element of time to these models. Rather 
than simply noting that certain individuals 
are less likely to recidivate upon release 
based on the number of crimes committed 
in the past, trajectory modeling can 
provide guidance on when individuals tip 
from one risk category into the next. In 
adding the element of time, this approach 
provides policy makers with additional 
information on how to address the size 
and cost of their state’s prison population.
The analysis conducted for this project 
is part of a series of papers that Dr. Bhati 
has produced on the topic of length 
of stay in prison and crime. His earlier 
work on this topic has been published 
in the Journal of Quantitative Criminology 
and the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology. Dr. Bhati is the founding 
president of Maxarth LLC. He has over 
ten years of experience conducting 
applied empirical research addressing 
challenging public policy questions. Dr. 
Bhati earned a Ph.D. in Economics from 
the American University (Washington, 
DC) in 2001 and has since successfully 
led several research efforts supported by 
the U.S. National Science Foundation, 
the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Court Services and Offender Supervision 
Agency for the District of Columbia, the 
American Statistical Association, and 
several foundations. He has consulted 
with several universities, research 
organizations, and practitioners. Dr. 
Bhati is the author of numerous articles 
and reports. His multi-disciplinary work 
can be found in such publications as 
Criminology, Econometric Reviews, Journal 
of Quantitative Criminology, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, Sociological 
Methodology, and Criminal Justice Policy 
Review. He serves on the editorial board of 
the Journal of Quantitative Criminology.
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